

## VI: The Berlin Crisis

By the mid-1950s the Soviets' Berlin strategy had changed. Although the expulsion of the Western Allies from the city undoubtedly remained a goal, after the suppression of the Berlin uprising in 1953 the Soviets gradually moved to at least a general acceptance of the status quo in Central Europe. For the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in particular, the first priorities in Soviet German policy were the stabilization and legitimization of the Soviet-backed East German regime. Ironically, Khrushchev seems to have been primarily concerned that the rapid revitalization of West Germany would allow it to break free of American influence and pursue a conservative-led irredentist policy in Central and Eastern Europe. That the Bonn Republic might remain a pacific, democratic state seems to have been dismissed as an implausibility by the Kremlin. By the fall of 1958, the Soviet leadership had apparently convinced itself that Bonn was planning to displace Soviet influence in Eastern Europe by a strategy of far-reaching economic penetration. The possibility of West German military action was discounted but not precluded.

Khrushchev thus acted to prop up the East German regime and dislodge Western forces from Berlin before the West German regime could grow too strong and independent. As a curtain raiser, the Soviets resumed regular interference with military trains to and from Berlin early in 1958. That November, Khrushchev issued a demand that the Western powers renounce their rights in Berlin in favor of the DDR. On the 27th of that month, he threatened to transfer unilaterally Soviet control of East Berlin and of the access routes to West Berlin to the DDR within the next six months, thereby putting an end to quadripartite control of the city and forcing the Western Allies to deal directly with the East German regime.

But the willingness of the US, Great Britain, and France to negotiate a solution to the Berlin problem seems to have convinced Khrushchev that it would be possible to persuade the West to abandon its support of what he perceived to be Bonn's aggressive designs toward Eastern Europe. In January 1959, Khrushchev sent clear signals that he would not go to war over Berlin, but would not be part of an agreement that included the Bonn government--which then had as its Chancellor the Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer--as a signatory. Khrushchev's subsequent willingness to submit the whole German question to a meeting of Foreign Ministers suggests that, by the following March, displacement of the Western powers from Berlin had moved into second place in Soviet priorities behind a draft German peace treaty. But this new plan fizzled: none of the Western Allies would agree to abandon Bonn and Khrushchev himself decided to defer the question, first until his trip to the US to meet with President Eisenhower that Fall and then until the Four-Power summit scheduled for the following May. In the meantime, he counseled patience to the East Berlin regime, but continued to pressure the Western Allies into a final settlement by threatening to sign a separate Soviet-East German peace treaty.

By the spring of 1960 it must have become apparent to Khrushchev that this strategy had not worked; that Western solidarity remained intact, and that a peace treaty and a solution of the Berlin question on terms agreeable to the Soviet Union was not in the offing. He thus used 1 May shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 spy plane as a pretext to kill the Paris summit, thereby avoiding being "outgunned

and humiliated" on the Berlin question. In doing so he also bought time to await possibly favorable changes in the Western leadership constellation: West German Chancellor Adenauer was faced with elections that September; President Eisenhower certainly was going to be replaced the following November. Replacement of one or both of these key figures might produce a political environment more favorable to a Soviet-backed peace treaty. Or so it was possible for Khrushchev to hope.

The principal intelligence problem in this Berlin crisis was to understand Khrushchev's shifting motives and to gauge how far he would go--and in which direction. However, as was frequently the case in analysis of political events, the US Intelligence Community often had little more to go on than was reported in the open press. Under such circumstances, the CIA's role was primarily to serve as a clearinghouse for information brought in from every conceivable source. The value of the intelligence provided to policymakers thus generally derived more from the experience and expertise of the intelligence officers producing the reports than from their access to any special sources of information. In this situation, intelligence derived from clandestine sources frequently filled in important gaps, or contributed an added dimension that otherwise would not be present.

As can be seen from the following documents, policymakers were provided with a broad spectrum of intelligence reporting. The most comprehensive, long-range analysis generally appeared in the periodic NIEs or Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs). But, as these could seldom be written quickly enough to keep up with developments, it was necessary to backstop and update this analysis with daily and weekly reports. These in turn provided much of the information used by the Board of National Estimates to draft the NIEs. Policymakers and senior officials also were kept apprised of events through daily briefings and--less frequently--other kinds of communications that do not necessarily appear in the historical record.

As the crisis developed over 1959, the status of the Soviet military presence in East Berlin was seen to be a key indicator of Soviet intentions. The KGB base in Karlshorst thus was closely monitored. Throughout the spring of 1959, there was much movement of Soviet personnel, but by the end of June it became obvious that, although the Soviets had delegated control of the sector crossings and access routes to the DDR, there would be no significant diminution in the Soviet presence in East Berlin. This fact helped Western analysts gauge Khrushchev's threats of a separate peace and decide how best to respond. Actually, it is still far from clear whether Khrushchev had ever intended a Soviet pullout from East Berlin--but then had been dissuaded by Western persistence--or whether it had all been a sham all along.

VI-1: CIWS: USSR Threatens Western Position in Berlin, 13 November 1958 (MORI No. 45621).

A near-contemporaneous analysis of Khrushchev's actions, largely from open sources, this report supplements the publicly available information with additional material from diverse sources-- such as an appraisal of East Germany's ability to provide trained air traffic controllers.

VI-2: CIWS: Internal Situation in East Germany, 11 December 1958 (MORI No. 45626).

Much like a newspaper, CIA often supplemented its daily reporting with longer, more in-depth analyses, such as this piece on the internal situation in the DDR that provides background on the situation in Berlin. Such reports generally reached a wider audience than if they were written in an NIE.

VI-3: SNIE 100-13-58: Soviet Objectives in the Berlin Crisis, 23 December 1958.

In this, the first Estimate to appear on the 1958 Berlin crisis, the Board of National Estimates takes advantage of its relative "distancing" from events to summarize and analyze developments before projecting future Soviet actions.

VI-4: CIWS: The Berlin Situation, 15 January 1959 (MORI No. 144339).

This excerpt from the weekly summary reports on the Soviet Peace Proposal announced five days previously and places it in context with concurrent developments in Germany and elsewhere.

VI-5: Cable: Current Status Report Soviet Compound Karlshorst. . ., 16 January 1959 (MORI No. 144340).

VI-6: Cable: Current Status Report Soviet Intelligence Services East Germany, 21 January 1959 (MORI No. 144341).

VI-7: Cable: B[e]rl[i]n Sitrep, 11 February 1959 (MORI No. 144342).

These reports show the Soviets making preparations for a large-scale evacuation of military personnel from Berlin, but also provide evidence that the KGB intended to remain. These three documents represent raw intelligence reporting--a key source for both current intelligence reports and the longer range Estimates. Only in exceptional circumstances would a policymaker receive intelligence in this form.

VI-8: CIWS: Communist Tactics Against West Berlin, 5 February 1959 (MORI No. 28210).

With Khrushchev more-or-less quiescent on Berlin in February 1959, the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary took advantage of the opportunity to summarize Soviet tactics to date. Such reporting supported and anticipated NIEs and SNIEs then in production or scheduled to appear--almost as a kind of "interim Estimate" (see below, Document VI-11).

VI-9: CIWS: Flight of Refugees From East Germany, 12 February 1959 (MORI No. 45580).

The DDR's biggest problem--and a major factor in the Berlin crisis--was the steady hemorrhage of defectors to the West. CIA tracked East Germany's refugee problem and reported on it periodically.

VI-10: SNIE 100-2-59: Probable Soviet Courses of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany, 24 February 1959.

Written in response to a request from Secretary of State Christian Herter, this Estimate addresses a series of questions concerning probable Soviet actions concerning Berlin and likely responses to proposed US actions. Compare it with Document VI-9, above. Estimates are, of course, generally much longer than current intelligence reports, but also are far more predictive in format and general subject matter.

VI-11: CIWS: USSR Prepares To Vacate East Berlin, 5 March 1959 (MORI No. 45584).

With Khrushchev threatening to turn over to East Germany all Soviet rights in Berlin as well as control of the access routes to the western half of the city, the status of the Soviet garrison in Berlin was seen as a solid indicator of future Soviet actions. The Soviet presence in Karlshorst thus was closely monitored. Note the shift in the tone of this document as compared with Document VI-5, above.

VI-12: CIA Memorandum: Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis, 27 March 1959 (MORI No. 14231).

Written solely for the President and his senior advisers, this CIA memorandum addresses issues similar to the SNIE prepared one month before (see Document VI-11), but discusses the possible outcomes of some of the more extreme courses of action that might be taken by the United States. It also refers specifically to the possibility that the Berlin crisis might escalate into an intercontinental nuclear exchange.

VI-13: IR: Soviet Official's Comments on the Berlin Situation, 6 April 1959 (MORI No. 144343).

The uncertainty prevailing in the Berlin crisis is reflected in this report from April 1959, which raises both the possibility of war and of Soviet measures short of war. Although this report gives the impression that the Soviets were about to pull their forces out of Berlin, CIA was unable to confirm this from other sources.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the Soviets did not withdraw from Karlshorst or East Berlin until the end of the Cold War.

VI-14: CIWS: The Problem of Western Access to Berlin, 30 April 1959 (MORI No. 45593).



As the East Germans assumed control of access corridors into and out of Berlin, the possibility of another blockade loomed. This report reviews Western access rights and the implications of a determined Soviet/East German attempt to block access to Berlin.

VI-15: CIWS: Foreign Ministers' Talks, 21 May 1959 (MORI No. 145741).

Here the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary documented Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between the three Western Allies in the Foreign Ministers' talks then under way. These efforts proved to be fruitless: the Western Alliance held fast on Berlin.

VI-16: SNIE 100-7-59: Soviet Tactics on Berlin, 11 June 1959.

A nuanced analysis of Khrushchev's motives and a prognosis of his future moves from the summer of 1959.

VI-17: Memorandum: U.S. Negotiating Position on Berlin, 1959-62, 13 July 1959 (MORI No. 11599).

With East and West well and truly deadlocked over Berlin, CIA sent forward a memorandum considering the impact that projected shifts in the balance of military power would have on the Berlin situation. The 1958 Berlin crisis introduced a new element into the confrontation in Central Europe: strategic nuclear weapons. Under Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet military had extensively adopted nuclear weaponry and modernized and expanded its long-range naval and airstriking forces. The Soviet Union could now legitimately lay claim to world-power status. Although it would be some time before the Soviet nuclear capabilities even approached those of the United States, contemporary intelligence reporting shows how from 1958 onward US planners had constantly to reckon with the possibility that a crisis in Central Europe might escalate into an intercontinental nuclear exchange--however unlikely that eventuality might be at any given moment. There was, in addition, the menace of theater nuclear weapons (e.g., shorter range weapons for use in Europe), of which both sides had large and growing inventories. Nuclear weapons are not known to have ever been deployed in Berlin by either side, but the Soviet and Western intelligence personnel deployed there now faced each other under the deepening shadow of the nuclear arms race.

VI-18: CIWS: East German Pressure for Access Controls Appears Suspended, 27 August 1959 (MORI No.45604).

Throughout the crisis, Khrushchev walked a narrow path between belligerency and outright confrontation. The difficulties in following his tacks and veers are seen in this current report, which shows him restraining the East German government on the eve of his trip to the United States to meet

with President Eisenhower.

VI-19: SNIE 100-5-60: The Soviet Attitude and Tactics on the Berlin Problem, 22 March 1960.

VI-20: CIWS: Khrushchev's Strategy on Berlin, 18 August 1960 (MORI No. 144106).

Over 1959-60, the US intelligence community continued to submit Khrushchev's Berlin tactics to periodic review. These two documents provide interesting counterpoints to each other--being written shortly before and after the May 1960 summit.

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18 November 1988

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

13 November 1958

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I


OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

USSR THREATENS WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN . . . . . Page 1

Khrushchev's threat on 10 November to "revise" the international status of Berlin presages a period of mounting tension in Germany during which the USSR will probably take steps to transfer to the East German regime Soviet authority in Berlin derived from quadripartite agreements. A new juridical basis for the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany would be established. These actions would be designed to force the West to deal with the Ulbricht regime in order to maintain Western access to Berlin. Kagan has hinted it might consider severing relations with Moscow if the USSR should abrogate the four-power agreement on Berlin.

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

USSR THREATENS WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN

Khrushchev's threats on 10 November to "revise" the international status of Berlin pre-empt a period of mounting tension in Germany. During this period the USSR will probably take a series of steps to transfer to the East German regime Soviet authority in Berlin derived from quadripartite agreements. A new juridical basis for the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany would be established.

Khrushchev declared that the Western powers, by violating the "Potsdam Agreement"—notably by sanctioning the remilitarization of West Germany—had forfeited their right to remain in West Berlin, and he indicated that the USSR would hand over its remaining functions to East Germany. He further declared that any attack on East Germany would be considered an attack on the USSR itself. He gave no indication, however, of how or when the USSR planned to hand over its functions. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 11 November said this would not happen immediately but would not be long delayed. Further, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official informed American Ambassador Thompson that German problems should be dealt with on a step-by-step basis.

The Soviet actions would be designed to enhance East German sovereignty, thus underlining the Soviet contention that there are two Germanies and, by invoking the threat of a blockade, to force the West to deal with the Ulbricht regime. A broader purpose may be to fur-

ther increase world tension with a "western Quagmire" in order to strengthen bloc unity against the common enemy and to block West German attempts to establish normal relations with the East European countries, particularly Poland. Further, the



move is designed to undercut forthcoming West German proposals regarding a four-power conference on German reunification.

Moscow's move at this time will strengthen the hand of the Ulbricht regime against popular unrest stemming from the sudden


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change in over-all policy from a "hard line" to one of concessions to certain elements of the populace. As a result of concessions to physicians, industrial workers were considering work slowdowns to pressure the regime into improving their own conditions.

Moreover, the flow of refugees to the West, although somewhat reduced, has continued. During October, more than 19,000 East Germans, including many intellectuals and technicians, fled to the West, approximately 75 percent through West Berlin. A sealing off of West Berlin would thus greatly diminish refugee losses.

In a press conference on 12 November, East German Premier Grotewohl, referring to the possibility of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, stated that he understood Khrushchev's speech raised such a possibility, "naturally" on the premise that the other powers took the same steps. This suggests that East German officials may depart for Moscow in the near future to negotiate a new agreement along these lines, perhaps after the forthcoming elections of 16 November, as reported by a fairly reliable source.

Moscow might transfer its membership in the Berlin Air

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Safety Center to the East Germans, thus confronting the West with a situation in which it would be required either to deal with East German officials or fly without guarantees of safety. However, the East Germans are not now believed to be in a position to exert effective control of flights in the corridor and they apparently do not possess the trained personnel to take over all the Soviet positions at this time.

West German officials believe that Khrushchev's speech is aimed at testing the firmness of the Western resolve to remain in Berlin and at exerting pressure on German public opinion to accept direct political talks with East Germany. French and British foreign affairs officials have strongly rejected any unilateral abrogation of the Potsdam Agreement, and the West German press chief on 13 November hinted that Bonn might consider severing its relations

with Moscow if the USSR abrogated the four-power status of Berlin.

Increased harassment of West Berlin and Allied and West German access to it is now likely. Various measures to inhibit traffic on the lifeline to Berlin could be taken by the USSR or East Germany, and the East Germans could move to seal off West Berlin by imposing border restrictions and halting municipal transport. Although West Berlin municipal officials report that there is no indication of public disquiet in the city, they feel that acceptance of East German control over highway access to Berlin would be an "intolerable situation." British officials in Berlin, however, warn of the danger of a "self-imposed" blockade if the Western powers refuse to accept East German control over access to Berlin.

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
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OCI NO. 5647/58

11 December 1958

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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


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


PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

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THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY..... Page 3


The Berlin issue has been brought forward at a time when Walter Ulbricht has completed the consolidation of his control of the East German party and government. He has purged his opponents and obtained the strong backing of Khrushchev; but his regime faces grave problems, and only sustained Soviet support will keep him in power. Control of access to West Berlin would solve two of East Germany's major problems--the exodus of refugees to the West and the influx of anti-Communist influences.

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THE WORK IN PROGRESS

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THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY

The reintroduction of the Berlin issue in international politics comes at a time when party boss Walter Ulbricht has solidified his control of the East German regime.

The Purge and Its Causes

Between mid-October 1957 and February 1958, Ulbricht forced a reluctant party central committee to adopt a sweeping program to speed up socialization--a move probably coordinated with Khrushchev during his visit to East Germany in August 1957. Party elements headed by Karl Schirdewan, who had generally been regarded as Ulbricht's successor, strongly condemned the proposed measures as unrealistic and likely to lead to dangerous public unrest; they called instead for a pro-

gram tailored to the country's needs. Schirdewan himself apparently felt that a slower pace would facilitate eventual German reunification, since drastic socialization of East Germany would make union extremely difficult. Pragmatic economists like Fred Oelssner, Heinrich Rau, and Fritz Selbmann pointed to the economic disorganization they thought would result from Ulbricht's decentralization measures.

The decisive clash between Ulbricht and the Schirdewan faction came at the 35th party plenum in February 1958. In a searing attack, Erich Honecker, Ulbricht's hatchet man, charged Schirdewan and former State Security Minister Ernst Wollweber with "fractional" activities--a major Communist crime--as well as with softness toward

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counterrevolutionaries and, in the case of Schirdewan, opposition to Ulbricht. Both were removed from the central committee. Former party theoretician



ULBRICHT

Oelssner was accused of "opportunism" in agricultural policies and opposition to Ulbricht's decentralization proposals, and was dropped from the politburo. Schirdewan, Wollweber, "and others" were further charged with "revisionist views" and faulty ideological interpretations.

The purge was completed last July at the fifth party congress--attended by Khrushchev--when no fewer than 17 central committee members and 10 candidate members were eliminated. Both Oelssner and Selbmann fell at this time.

Other high-level functionaries who have at times wavered in their support of Ulbricht survived, at least temporarily. These included Rau, who was retained as a politburo member and deputy premier, and Premier Grotewohl, who went on "a rest cure of several weeks" in the USSR after the plenum--lending support to reports that his position was shaky.

Effect of Purge

The purge restored party "unity," but uncertainty and unrest were rampant throughout the party apparatus. Since Schirdewan had headed the party's personnel office, many functionaries were personally linked with him and fearful for their positions.

The elimination of Schirdewan and others who had had some measure of popular approval confirmed for East Germans, especially the intellectuals, that there was little hope for any real improvement in political conditions.

To replace the purgees, Ulbricht installed several new central committee secretaries, including Honecker and certain district party secretaries. Control of the party personnel organization was turned over to Berlin party boss Alfred Neumann, thus marking him as a man of increasing importance. Ulbricht's personal toady, Erich Mielke, had earlier replaced Wollweber in the Ministry of State Security.



HONECKER

Ulbricht then rammed through the party congress his political and economic program

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keyed to overtaking West Germany in consumer-goods production and food consumption by 1961 and pushing ahead to complete the "building of socialism" by 1965. The implementation of economic decentralization actually was designed to give Ulbricht even closer control over all East German economic life, since the measure provided for greatly increased authority to the State Planning Commission, which is headed by Ulbricht's tool, Bruno Leuschner.

This far-reaching economic program was based on closer economic ties with the USSR. As a measure of Soviet economic aid, East Germany's annual payments for the maintenance of Soviet occupation forces, estimated at approximately \$150,000,000, were canceled effective 1 January 1959. Special targets for socialization were small businesses and agriculture, while the professional classes--notably doctors--were to be brought into state-controlled organizations.

Communist indoctrination was to be stepped up in schools through "polytechnical" education--i.e., combined physical labor and study obligatory for all students above the age of eleven. By 1960 all prospective university students were to have served for one year in a factory, in agriculture, or in the armed forces.

These measures were accompanied by intensified efforts to limit contacts with West Germany through curtailed travel and by more stringent police measures against defectors and those who aided them.

Consequences of Hard Course

The new program vastly increased smoldering popular discontent and seriously disrupted certain areas of the economy, notably retail trade. Regime promises were treated with derision. Essentially, however,

political oppression and severance of ties with the West constituted the main grievances.

According to a reliable Western correspondent who visited



LEUSCHNER

Leipzig in September, no one could complain of "really critical shortages of the main things people eat and wear," but Leipzigers were apprehensive in the face of advancing socialization. Small shopkeepers feared they would be wiped out in the next few months. The correspondent also noted that people referred to the 17 June 1953 uprising as if it had happened yesterday.

Even more than the "bourgeois remnants," East Germany's intellectuals--professional men, scientists, technicians, university professors, and students--began to despair of a change for the better. Already hard hit by repression and increasingly barred from contact with West Germany and Western culture, intellectuals were subjected to unremitting demands for ideological subservience. In the universities, politically unreliable professors were dismissed and students were forced to take an oath to support the regime. Twenty-four Jena University students and young workers were secretly tried in early October for allegedly plotting against the regime and proposing reunification with West

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Germany on the basis of free elections. A Jena University official who defected said these students became the "toast of the Soviet Zone." East Germans now knew the truth of Pasternak's description--"the feeling of the state closing in on individual privacy."

Oppression of the middle class and intellectuals led--as the Schirdewan group had warned--to a mass exodus to the West. Professional men, scientists, and technicians whom the regime could ill afford to lose constituted an increasingly large proportion of the refugees. Many were party members. In the first nine months of 1958, more than 250 university professors and instructors, 2,393 schoolteachers, and many youths escaped. The loss of 813 doctors, approximately 8 percent of East Germany's total, left some areas temporarily without medical care. The flight of business executives, retailers, and artisans left dangerous gaps in the economy. Opposition in the higher levels of the party to Ulbricht's economic policies was mounting, reportedly centered as before among the pragmatic economists in the government, including the State Planning Commission. Reflecting such opinions, a fairly


reliable source reported that Heinrich Rau had warned Moscow that mass disaffection of farmers, workers, and intellectuals was building up.

Shift to Softer Party Line

By early September it apparently became clear even to Ulbricht that a drastic change in the party line was required to reduce popular unrest and stem the refugee flow. The new line was unveiled with an announcement of far-reaching concessions to doctors to permit private practice, do away with ideological qualifications, and permit travel to the West. To implement the new policies, two special politburo commissions were set up under Kurt Hager: one received sweeping powers to make "all possible" concessions to doctors; the second was to supervise school affairs.

In a move to stem the flight of small businessmen and artisans, Ulbricht himself announced a slowdown in the socialization of small business enterprises, giving notice that "in one or two years" such individuals would probably enter a socialized agency "voluntarily." Party activists and officials were

EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET ZONE AND THE SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN



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accused of arbitrarily raising work norms or being overzealous in carrying out party directives to collectivize independent farmers, and their co-



HAGER

ercive measures were stigmatized as "distortions" of party congress directives.

Although Ulbricht probably had discussed his modifications of the hard line with Khrushchev during his visit to the USSR in August, a delegation of ten high-level Soviet party functionaries was sent to East Germany in early September to survey the situation and to impress East Germans that the shift in policy had the Kremlin's blessing.

The further demotion of Fritz Selbmann at this time from his post as deputy premier and his removal from the staff of the party theoretical journal probably were meant as a warning to Ulbricht's party opponents not to misinterpret the shift to a softer line.

Pressure for More Concessions

Ulbricht's reversal immediately began to backfire.

Many people conceived the idea that the regime's difficulties could be exploited to gain concessions for themselves, particularly since the approaching elections made the regime somewhat more responsive to public opinion. The populace in general became more open in its criticism. An American officer during a tour talked with many East Germans who were "highly derisive and sarcastic" about the Russians and the East German regime. He noted that he had never before heard such bitter and outspoken criticism expressed so openly. Workers in the important Launa works were openly cynical about the elections.

Responding to these pressures, the regime instituted further concessions to improve living conditions. On 3 November the politburo announced that more consumer goods would be available, demanded that private retailers receive adequate supplies, and sharply reproached government officials for permitting price increases.

As did the purge of the Schirdewan group, Ulbricht's maneuvers increased intraparty strains. Party officials found it difficult to adapt themselves to the new line.

The Berlin Gambit

Against this background, the introduction of the Berlin issue appears designed at least in part to strengthen the East German regime by emphasizing its "sovereignty" and eliminating West Berlin as a Western enclave in the bloc. Moscow's handling of the affair has played up Ulbricht's authority, and his adherents in the party are reported gloating over the adoption of "his" policies by Khrushchev.

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Ulbricht in the meantime appears to be taking even more decisive steps to tighten his control over the party organization. A source with connections on the East German party central committee reports that an internal screening of officials in the central party ap-



paratus now is in progress. As a result, morale is said to be low among these employees, and tension and mutual distrust are rising daily.

Since Schirdewan's dismissal, no other party figure has emerged as a potential contender for power or even as heir apparent among the top party leadership. Of the possible successors, Hermann Matern and, more recently, Alfred Neumann appear to hold the edge; Moscow-trained Erich Honecker might in time aspire to the mantle.

The outlook for the East German people is gloomy. Ulbricht's recent concessions were purely tactical, and he has not basically retreated from



his intention to impose Communism on the people. Recent developments, moreover, have made East Germany increasingly dependent on the USSR both politically and economically. If access to the West through West Berlin is cut off--the interzonal borders are already largely sealed--little hope of escape will remain for East Germans, who will be forced to make their peace with Ulbricht on his terms. Ulbricht and his party will still be faced with an essentially unstable internal situation--one of such magnitude that the USSR knows it cannot safely withdraw its troops for a long time to come.

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SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Date 7/12/93

HRP B-3

## SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

### THE PROBLEM

To assess Soviet objectives and probable policy in the Berlin situation.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. Moscow's move to raise the issue of Berlin at this time is probably not the result of any single development but stems from several converging factors; some of these bear on the shoring up of the Communist position in Eastern Europe, others on weakening the Allied position in Germany and in Western Europe generally. We view Moscow's move as another manifestation of the hardening tendency in Soviet foreign policy and of the Soviet's growing confidence in the general strength of the Bloc's position vis-a-vis the Western Powers.
2. We believe that the Soviet objectives in their move against Berlin include:
  - a. To remove or reduce the disruptive influence which Berlin poses to the East German regime and thus to the consolidation of the Soviet order in Eastern Europe.
  - b. To increase the international prestige of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in order to strengthen the regime's internal position and to support the Soviet-GDR program to "reunify" Germany by confederation.
  - c. To move the West toward acceptance of the USSR's version of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe.
  - d. To foster discord among the NATO states, to reduce West German confidence in its allies, and to encourage Bonn to seek a separate deal with the USSR on the German problem.
  - e. To bring about West Germany's withdrawal from NATO and to impose limitation on German armament, and particularly to prevent German acquisition of a nuclear capability.
  - f. To maneuver the West into accepting Soviet proposals for an early summit meeting and perhaps to induce the US to enter bilateral top-level negotiations.
3. If the Soviets fail to make significant progress in possible negotiations with the Allies, they will sooner or later have to face up to the question of fulfilling their announced intention to turn over to East Germany their controls over access to West Berlin. Their decision will be greatly affected by the Soviet assessment of

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the degree of tension which had developed and particularly the firmness of the Western position at the time, and it is possible that the Soviet leaders might decide to back down under whatever smokescreen of explanation seems most expedient. However, we consider it more likely that the USSR would proceed with the turnover of controls to the East Germans. The Soviet leaders probably intend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct

Soviet and East German maneuvering in a manner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise on major issues. Nevertheless, they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, with considerable chance of miscalculation by one or both sides.

## DISCUSSION

4. Moscow's move to raise the issue of Berlin at this time is probably not the result of any single development but stems from several converging factors; some of these bear on the shoring up of the Communist position in Eastern Europe, others on weakening the Allied position in Germany and in Western Europe generally. We view Moscow's move as another manifestation of the hardening tendency in Soviet foreign policy and of the Soviet's growing confidence in the general strength of the Bloc's position vis-a-vis the Western Powers. Khrushchev apparently genuinely believes that Soviet weapons advances and economic successes are shifting the world balance of power. The strength of this conviction, frequently expressed in recent Communist pronouncements, is evident from the firmness with which he has demanded that the issue of Berlin be reopened. Soviet leaders must be aware that there is virtually no point of controversy between East and West on which the West has so thoroughly committed itself, and that there can scarcely be a more dangerous international issue to push to the point of crisis.

5. We do not believe that the more assertive tone of Soviet foreign policy in general or the Soviet move on Berlin in particular indicate any greater Soviet willingness deliberately to risk general war. The Soviets have almost certainly not intended to give the crisis the

character of a military showdown but have intended to develop it in political terms. Thus Moscow will seek to avoid placing itself in any position from which it must either back down completely or resort to military force. Nevertheless, Soviet prestige is already strongly committed on the Berlin issue: the Soviet Government has announced that it will turn over to the East Germans its functions in Berlin, including access controls. The Soviets have given public assurances of military support to East Germany in the event that the latter's "frontiers" are "violated" by the Allies. The Soviets may even believe that the West itself is less disposed to run substantial risk of war and that therefore the Western Alliance is more likely to give in to pressure.

## PRINCIPAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES

6. We believe that the Soviet objectives in their move against Berlin include:

- a. To remove or reduce the disruptive influence which Berlin poses to the East German regime and thus to the consolidation of the Soviet order in Eastern Europe.
- b. To increase the international prestige of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in order to strengthen the regime's internal position and to support the Soviet-GDR program to "reunify" Germany by confederation.

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c. To move the West toward acceptance of the USSR's version of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe.

d. To foster discord among the NATO states, to reduce West German confidence in its allies, and to encourage Bonn to seek a separate deal with the USSR on the German problem.

e. To bring about West Germany's withdrawal from NATO and to impose limitation on German armament, and particularly to prevent German acquisition of a nuclear capability.

f. To maneuver the West into accepting Soviet proposals for an early summit meeting and perhaps to induce the US to enter bilateral top-level negotiations.

7. The first three of these objectives are concerned with shoring up the Communist position in Eastern Europe, a problem which has preoccupied the Soviets especially during the past few years. The political and economic stability of the GDR has been a troublesome problem, which has been pointed up in recent months by the flight of professional personnel through West Berlin. If the Western Powers could be persuaded to withdraw their forces from Berlin, the GDR authorities would be able to restrict the flow of refugees as well to reduce the political challenge which West Berlin has presented the GDR. Together with implicit Western recognition of East Germany, these developments would significantly reinforce the Soviet position in Eastern Europe by giving permanence and stability to the weakest and most exposed of the satellite regimes. Barring an Allied withdrawal, the Soviets hope to force the Allies into official dealings with East German authorities on the question of access to Berlin. They hope thus to strengthen the international prestige of East Germany, formalize the division of Germany (with adverse effects on the populations of both West and East Germany), and lay the foundation for further pressure on the Allies' presence in Berlin.

8. At the same time, and by the same measures, the Soviet leaders aim to undermine the Allied position in Western Europe. They

probably believe that they can use a Berlin crisis to exploit latent differences among the Allies concerning the German problem in general, and the method of dealing with the GDR in particular. They hope to estrange the Federal Republic from its allies, since any Western accommodation with the GDR would convince large sections of German opinion that the West was retreating from the position it had hitherto taken on reunification. The Soviet leaders probably believe that any apparent failure of the Bonn Government to maintain close association with the Western great powers would undermine its domestic position, spread feelings of helplessness and isolation among the West German population, and lead to broader support for an attempt to explore the possibility of a separate deal with the USSR on the German problem. It is probably the Soviet view that if such tendencies became dominant in West Germany, the collapse of NATO and its defense structure would be in sight.

#### POSSIBLE COURSES OF SOVIET ACTION

9. The Soviets almost certainly did not expect Western acceptance of their 27 November proposal to make West Berlin a "free city." They probably foresee some form of negotiations with the allies before they turn over to the East Germans control over Western access to Berlin. However, it is possible that in certain eventualities, such as an outright Western refusal to enter into negotiations, the Soviets would take this step before the expiration of the six months' period stipulated in their note. At any stage of the crisis, of course, they may threaten to make such a move in order to put pressure on the Allies. But, on the whole, we believe it unlikely that they will actually make a precipitate move, regardless of initial Western responses.

10. The Soviets probably now anticipate a Western proposal to discuss Berlin within the context of the entire German problem. We do not think that such a proposal would be greeted with outright Soviet rejection but would probably be met with counteroffers designed to exploit any show of Allied indecision generated by the Berlin crisis.

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11. At least initially, any such counteroffers would probably center around Soviet proposals for disengagement in Central Europe and/or for negotiations on a German peace treaty. These might be presented in the form of a Soviet package for a general European settlement which would include such proposals as a revised Rapacki Plan, the immediate conclusion of a German peace treaty as a step toward confederation of two German states, and an East-West nonaggression pact. The Soviets might make some conciliatory gestures in order to render their proposals more palatable.

12. In making such proposals, the Soviets would estimate that certain elements of European opinion would react favorably to those features of their proposals which provide for military disengagement — withdrawal of forces and banning of nuclear weapons from Central Europe. They would expect to appeal in particular to those Westerners who regard the presence of nuclear-equipped forces of both sides in Germany as a main cause of tension and war danger. They would hold out the prospect to the Social Democrats and neutralists in West Germany that further progress toward unification would be possible once acceptance of Soviet proposals had brought a general easing of the tensions which surround the German problem. By appeals of this kind to various elements of opinion in Europe, they would try to make it as difficult as possible for the Western European Powers to reject their proposals altogether.

13. We believe it likely that at some moment which the Soviets judge favorable they will again bring forward a dramatic proposal for a summit meeting on the whole array of issues which will have been raised. The moment chosen for this move would be one at which tensions were high over the prospect of a deadlock; and at which the Soviets might consider opinion in the West to be deeply divided over the next steps. In such a summit meeting the Soviets would try to bring the Western Powers to accept agreements which, while trumpeted as a great advance for peace, would in fact amount to acceptance of the main Soviet terms.

14. Whether or not a summit meeting develops, the Soviets, either to stimulate further negotiations on Germany as a whole or to overcome a deadlock, might at some stage attach new features to their "free city" proposals to make them more attractive to Western opinion. They may, for example, offer to include East Berlin in their proposal for a demilitarized "free city." They may also offer to place access to the city under formal UN guarantees, perhaps with UN observers present in the city and on access routes. Such offers would almost certainly still be conditional on the continuation of a Communist government in the Eastern sector, an end to the East German refugee flow through West Berlin, and a cessation of Allied "subversive" and intelligence activities in the city.

15. We thus believe that Soviet tactics will retain some flexibility, the better to take advantage of the situation as it develops. However, Soviet opposition to German reunification on any basis other than a confederation which preserved Communist East Germany will be in the background of all Soviet maneuvers. The Soviet leaders almost certainly do not contemplate relinquishing control over East Germany because of the threat such action would pose to their whole position in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland.

16. If the Soviets fail to make significant progress in possible negotiations with the Allies, they will sooner or later have to face up to the question of fulfilling their announced intention to turn over to East Germany their controls over access to West Berlin. Their decision will be greatly affected by the Soviet assessment of the degree of tension which had developed and particularly the firmness of the Western position at the time, and it is possible that the Soviet leaders might decide to back down under whatever smoke-screen of explanation seems most expedient. However, we consider it more likely that the USSR would proceed with the turnover of controls to the East Germans. The Soviet leaders probably intend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and East German maneuver-

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ing in a manner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise

on major issues. Nevertheless, they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, with considerable chance of miscalculation by one or both sides.

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15 January 1959

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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DATE 15C-979 REVIEWED [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1: OCT 1960

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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

15 January 1959

**PART I  
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST**

**THE BERLIN SITUATION**

**Soviet Peace Proposal**

The USSR's notes of 10 January to the Western powers calling for a conference in Warsaw or Prague within two months to conclude a German peace treaty and to discuss the Berlin question are intended to demonstrate Soviet desire to negotiate. The USSR wishes to appear responsive to Western objections to discussing Berlin except within the wider framework of Germany and European security. Soviet leaders apparently expect that the proposal to hold a peace conference will place the Soviet Union in a position to exploit growing pressures within the Western powers—especially West Germany and Britain—for a general policy review of problems relating to German reunification.

The draft peace treaty appended to the notes elaborates the 11 "basic provisions" for a treaty set forth in the aide-memoire Nikoyan delivered to Secretary Dulles on 5 January. It is essentially a formula for a neutral Germany, with the central theme that Western recognition of two Germanys is necessary to any progress on a German settlement. It provides for participation by both Germanys in the negotiation and signing of a treaty. If a German confederation should then exist, it would also be represented.

The draft also provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, a ban on German possession and produc-

tion of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction as well as bombers and submarines, and a prohibition on German participation in military alliances directed against any of the signatory powers. It would bind "Germany" to suppress any Nazi organizations and activities as well as any organizations, including those of refugees, hostile to any of the Allied powers. A demilitarized "free city" of Berlin would be established pending the reunification of Germany.

The notes warned again that Western refusal to negotiate will not prevent the USSR from "renouncing its functions in Berlin" and transferring control over Allied access to Berlin to the East Germans, but failed to mention again the six-month deadline. Moscow is in a position to be able to hand over its quadripartite functions in Berlin to the East German regime at any time.

Moscow probably does not expect a conference to take place now on these terms. Soviet leaders apparently hope, however, that constant pressure will eventually produce a break in the Western position on Germany and European security or at least will lead to greater popular acceptance of the Soviet view that rapprochement between the two German states is the only solution to the reunification problem.

**West European Reaction**

Chancellor Adenauer called for outright rejection of the

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 January 1959

Soviet draft treaty, and the West German press backed up this demand with sharp criticism of the treaty as demanding a "second surrender" of Germans. On the question of future negotiations, there was less unanimity in Bonn than elsewhere. Most papers saw a high-level meeting on Germany taking place within the next few months. The pro-Social Democratic (SPD) press and some independent papers called for negotiations in the hope of inducing the Soviet Union to modify its "excessive demands." SPD Deputy Chairman Wehner warned against flatly rejecting the Soviet proposals.

Chancellor Adenauer has taken steps to assess world opinion on Berlin. West Berlin Mayor Brandt will undertake a tour of the Far East and hold talks with Nehru. Press Chief von Eckardt will sound out opinion in the UN on a possible UN trusteeship for Berlin, with Western troops acting as UN executors. A top Foreign Ministry official, Herbert Dittmann, has also made a hurried trip to Washington on Adenauer's instructions.

An analysis of Mikoyan's 10 January note makes clear the Soviet aim of neutralizing Germany without reunification. Some of the French press, however, noted a more conciliatory language, which was felt to indicate Moscow's desire for negotiations.

The British press with near unanimity continues to argue for "less negative" Western re-

sponses and discussions of the revised Rapacki plan. The Manchester Guardian observed that "an unconstructive Russian approach is not justification for an unconstructive Western reply."

East Germany - Berlin

Strongly echoing Moscow's claim that East Germany is a fully sovereign state, the Ulbricht regime now appears to be laying the groundwork for an eventual claim that it is the only legitimate German state. Its note of 7 January to Moscow reiterated that West Berlin belongs to East Germany. The note further declared that the East Berlin municipal authorities are the "sole rightful organs" for the whole city. Premier Grotewohl's tour of the Middle East is also designed to underline East German claims to sovereignty. Following Grotewohl's minor successes in Cairo and Baghdad, he saw Nehru, but apparently failed to change India's policy of nonrecognition of East Germany.

Soviet authorities in Berlin are continuing to insist that American authorities must now deal with East Germany on all questions concerning American military personnel in East Germany and East Berlin.

While the Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin continues its normal activities at Karlshorst, a Soviet pamphlet, commenting on the Soviet note of 27 November, explicitly stated that the Kommandatura would be closed down and the guard troops attached to it withdrawn from the city as part of the Soviet handover of its functions to East Germans. American officials note that the USSR is reported to be closing down

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 January 1959

the important ordinance facility at Berlin/Oberschoenebeide and believe the termination of this facility will probably

occur when other Soviet forces are withdrawn from the city. (SECRET EOROM)

**CLASSIFIED MESSAGE**

DATE: 16 JAN 59

TO: THE HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, the Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: BERLIN

ACTION: EE 6

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Date: 3/2/45

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JAN 16 1959

ROUTINE 308

TO: DIR INFO: [REDACTED] CITE: BRN [REDACTED]

INTEL

EGS [REDACTED] DOI: 20 DEC 58-15 JAN 59 SUBJ: CURRENT STATUS REPORT SOVIET COMPOUND KARLSHORST, EAST. BRN. APPR: 3 DA: 25 DEC 58-15 JAN 59

SOURCE: VARIOUS GERMAN EMPLOYEES KARLSHORST COMPOUND (C).

**GENERAL:**

1. RENOVATION KOMMANDATURA HEADQUARTERS IN KARLSHORST BEGINNING 1 JAN 59. DELAYED UNKNOWN REASON.
2. 59 BUDGET FOR REPAIRS SOV MILITARY BILLET AND INSTALLATIONS KARLSHORST COMPOUND DRASTICALLY CUT.
3. NO MOVEMENT NOTED SOV GUARD UNIT, TANK UNIT OR MILITARY HOSP KARLSHORST.
4. GERMAN CHIEF OF BRN HOUSING ADMIN UNIT FOR SOV HOUSING KARLSHORST COMPOUND TOLD EMPLOYEES HE NOT BEING TRANSFERRED AS UNIT WOULD SHORTLY BE DISSOLVED. ALSO STATED ALL SOV DEPENDENTS DEPARTING SEPTEMBER 59 AND SOV EMB SCHOOL WOULD BE CLOSED THAT TIME.

**KGB:**

5. NUMBER SOV EMPLOYED KGB HEADQUARTERS KARLSHORST COMPOUND PACKING BELONGING

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FORM 1389

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PAGE 2  
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- TO: 6. RUMOR AMONG GERMAN KGB MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES IF KGB LEAVES KARLSHORST WILL BE REESTABLISHED VICINITY BRLN. CITE
7. KGB PLANS RELEASE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING (ST ANTONIUS HOSP, KARLSHORST COMPOUND) DELAYED AS BUILDINGS IN STRAUSBERG NOT YET READY.
8. MANY KGB EMPLOYEES ASSUMING SOV EMB AND TRADE DELEG COVER.
9. KGB SOV EMPLOYEE USING EMB COVER STATED ONLY MILITARY PERSONS VACATING E BRLN. EMB AND TRADE DELEG WILL REMAIN. THIS MOVE TO BE EFFECTED WHETHER AMERICANS LEAVE OR NOT.
10. BETWEEN 25 AND 31 DEC 58 HEADQUARTERS OF MF'S ADMIN SECTION RESPONSIBLE KGB ADVISOR BILLETS KARLSHORST VACATED.
11. KARLSHORST HEADQUARTERS MVD ADVISORS TO E GER SECURITY FORCES VACATED SHORTLY BEFORE CHRISTMAS. GERMAN JANITOR THIS HEADQUARTERS REPORTED UNIT POSSIBLY MOVING STRAUSBERG. RI
- RU:
12. IN CONNECTION SOV MILITARY WITHDRAWAL RU STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT LOCATED GODESBERGER AND WESELERSTR KARLSHORST COMPOUND PLACING SOME PERSONNEL UNDER COVER OFFICE MILATT SOV EMB REMAINDER REASSIGNED HEADQUARTERS CSFG WUENS DORF
13. FIELD COMMENT: ABOVE AND PREVIOUS REPORTS INDICATE DEFINITE PLANNING

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PAGE 3

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TO INFO CITE

FOR EVACUATION ALL SOY MILITARY UNITS KARLSHORST AREA AND PROBABLE REESTABLISHMENT IN SOY ZONE VICINITY BRLN, SOME IN STRAUSBERG. BULK RU BEING TRANSFERRED GSFG, SOY CIVILIAN UNITS SUCH AS EMB AND TRADE DELG WILL REMAIN E BRLN. KGB SUPPORT UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE MOVED INTO ZONE VICINITY BRLN WITH OPERATIONAL TYPES REMAINING E BRLN UTILIZING EMB, TRADE DELG OR OTHER CIVILIAN AGENCY COVER. ON CONJUNCTION EVACUATION MILITARY EXPECT CONSOLIDATION KARLSHORST COMPOUND WITH LARGE PORTION RELEASED TO GERMANS. REPORT EVACUATION SOVIET DEPENDENTS NOT YET CONFIRMED.

DISSEM: USCGB AND USBER.

RELEASE 161130Z.

END OF MESSAGE

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| DATE  | 21 Jan 59   | ROUTING             |
| TO  | DIRECTOR  | 1 2 3 4 5 6         |
| FROM  | BERLIN  | JAN 21 2056Z 59     |
| ACTION  | This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency. | ROUTINE             |
| INFO  |   |                     |
| TO  | DIR   | CITE BRLN 1814      |
| INTEL   |   |                     |
|   | SUBJ: CURRENT STATUS REPORT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES EAST GERMANY.  |                     |
| SOURCE:   |   |                     |
| <p>1. FOR PERIOD 1 DEC 1958 TO 15 JAN 1959 NO INDICATION UNUSUAL NUMBER SOV MILITARY INTER (RU) OFFICERS OR DEPENDENTS DEPARTED KARLSHORST COMPOUND; TRAFFIC RELATIVELY LIGHT. MOST SIGNIFICANT WAS DEPARTURE 14 JAN MG BELOV PRESUMED IDEN WITH CHIEF OF AGENT OPERATIONS SECTION RU/GSFG. BELOV ALLEGEDLY GOING ON LEAVE, HOWEVER THIS COULD PORTEND WITHDRAWAL RU/GSFG ELEMENTS BERLIN KARLSHORST TO WUENSdorf OR ELSEWHERE IN ZONE. NO CURRENT INFO RE STATUS RU/GSFG INTEL POINTS IN EAST GERMANY.</p> <p>2. AT PRESENT NO INDICATION CUT-BACKS OR EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL TRANSFERS SOV MILITARY STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FROM KARLSHORST. THRU DECEMBER 58 NO INFO RECEIVED INDICATE DE-REQUISITIONING BILLETS OCCUPIED BY IDENTIFIED STRAT INTEL OFFICERS. AS OF EARLY JAN 59 KEY STRAT INTEL SENIOR OFFICERS STILL OCCUPIES BILLETS KARLSHORST. HOWEVER, SOME STRAT INTEL PERSONNEL KARLSHORST BEING PLACED UNDER COVER OFFICE MILATT SOV EMB, REMAINDER EXPECT TO BE REASSIGNED HEADQUARTERS GSFG WUENSdorf FOR COVER.</p> |   |                     |
| <p>REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED</p> <p><small>COLLTYPE - PHOTO COPY RIGHTS RESERVED - PHOTOCOPY, INC., MANASSA PARK, VA. 20108</small></p>   |   |                     |

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PAGE 2

| TO   | INFO | CITE |
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| <p>3. AFTER FLURRY SOVIET STATE SECURITY (KGB) DEPARTURES REPORTED LATE FALL 58 WHICH PROBABLY CONNECTED WITH WITHDRAWAL ADVISERS, SUBSEQUENT KGB DEPARTURES CURTAILED. BETWEEN MID-DEC 58 AND MID-JAN 59 RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER PERSONNEL REPORTED DEPARTED; ONLY SLIGHTLY ABOVE AVERAGE. NO CONFIRMATION THAT ADVISERS RETURNED BERLIN.</p> <p>4. KGB HOUSING WITHIN KARLSHORST COMPOUND REDUCED BY APPROXIMATELY 16 UNITS IN LAST QUARTER 1958. THIS FIGURE COMPARES WITH FIGURE OF CIRCA 50 UNITS DROPPED THIRD QUARTER MANY OF WHICH PICKED UP ON PAPER IMMEDIATELY AS MILITARY OR SOVIET EMBASSY HOUSING. THIS INDICATES GRADUAL TRANSFER KGB HOUSING TO OTHER COVER BUT NOT SHARP REDUCTION KGB PERSONNEL. PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PLANS FOR EVACUATION KGB HEADQUARTERS BUILDING AT ST ANTONIUS HOSPITAL RECENTLY CONFIRMED BUT DATE NOT YET KNOWN.</p> |      |      |

END OF MESSAGE

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**TO:** DIRECTOR

**FROM:** BERLIN

**ACTION:** EE 6

**INFO:** [REDACTED]

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Date 5/2/85

HRP 95-1

1. [REDACTED] EXTENSIVE RECENT REPORTING LEAD CONCLUSION STRONG PROBABILITY SOVIETS MAKING FIRM PREPARATIONS CARRY OUT AS MINIMUM ACTION COMPLETE TRANSFER DDR REMAINING VESTIGES OCCUPATION RIGHTS EAST BRLN UPON EXPIRATION SIX MONTHS DEADLINE. APPARENT SOVS DESIROUS HAVING PREPARATIONS COMPLETE ENABLE SUCH TURNOVER EVEN IF SUBSEQUENTLY MAY POSSIBLY DECIDE DEFER TIMING OR TAKE ALTERNATE ACTION POSSIBLY AS RESULT SUBSTANCE PROGRESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH WEST.

2. BELIEVE FOLLOWING PORTIONS REF REPORTING PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. PREPARATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY PHYSICALLY REMOVE VESTIGES SOV MILITARY OCCUPATION EAST BRLN. CERTAIN RIS PERSONNEL REPORTED CHANGING OPS COVER FROM

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

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Copy No. [REDACTED]

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PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE

MILITARY TO SOV TRADE DELEGATION OR EMBASSY EAST BRLN WHILE OTHER RIS TYPES BEING MOVED EITHER GSFG HQ WUENSdorf OR ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE BRLN [REDACTED] NEW QUARTERS REPORTED CURRENTLY BEING READIED BERNAU/WANDLITZ AREA PRESUMABLY FOR SOV MILITARY UNITS NOW LOCATED EAST BRLN [REDACTED] ALL SOV LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CONNECTIONS TO KARLSHORST TO BE DISCONNECTED NEAR FUTURE [REDACTED] THREE NEW 70-PAIR CABLE LINKS CURRENTLY REPORTED UNDER CONSTRUCTION BETWEEN BRLN NIEDERSCHOENHAUSEN AND WANDLITZ AREA WITH DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION BY 25 MAY 55 [REDACTED] CERTAIN SOV COMMO EQUIPMENT ALSO REPORTED MOVED FROM KARLSHORST TO VICINITY STRAUSBERG [REDACTED] IMPROBABLY SOVS WOULD UNDERTAKE ABOVE ACTIVITY UNLESS THEY SERIOUS ABOUT REMOVING THEIR MILITARY UNITS FROM EAST BRLN [REDACTED] HOWEVER SUGGEST WHILE SOVS MAY PHYSICALLY MOVE OUTSIDE EAST BRLN THEY WILL STILL REMAIN CLOSELY TIED DDR GOVT AND IN CLOSE PROXIMITY BRLN. FURTHER, PREVIOUSLY REPORTED APPEARANCE SOVIET AIR FORCE INSTRUCTORS FOR DDR VOLKSARMEE LUFT BASC PERSONNEL ALSO APPEARS SIGNIFICANT SOV INTENTIONS THIS CONNECTION.

3. BOB COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CONCEIVABLE THESE INDICATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY DESIGN SUGGEST TO WEST FIRM SOVIET POSTURE AND DETERMINATION DIVEST THEMSELVES OCCUPATION RESPONSIBILITY (EXCEPT FOR GSFG) IN FAVOR DDR, DOUBT THIS THE CASE AND BELIEVE EXTENT OF ACTUAL PREPARATIONS NOTED CLEARLY INDICATIVE SERIOUS

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| CLASSIFIED MESSAGE |                   | ROUTING   |   |
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| INFO :             | PAGE 3            | BRLN <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">[REDACTED]</span> |   |
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SOVIET INTENTION MAKE FULL TURNOVER CONTROL FUNCTIONS DDR AS ANNOUNCED. DO NOT FEEL HAVE SUFFICIENTLY FIRM INTELLIGENCE HERE NOW SPECULATE WITH ANY AUTHORITY FURTHER ON EXTENT OR TIMING WHICH BERLIN ACCESS MAY BE RESTRICTED OR METHODS EXERCISE CONTROL FUNCTIONS BY DDR DURING PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOVER. DEVELOPMENTS NEAR FUTURE CONNECTION EXCHANGE NOTES POSSIBLE AGREED NEGOTIATIONS ETC MAY THROW FURTHER LIGHT THESE POINTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: Reported construction of large permanent housing and administrative complex in East Germany.

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OCI NO.0487/59

5 February 1959

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1987  
AUTH: 76-2  
DATE: 12/27/77 REVIEWER: [REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

17 OCT 1959

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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

**'5 February' 1959**

### PART III

## PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

## COMMUNIST TACTICS AGAINST WEST BERLIN


The vulnerabilities inherent in West Berlin's isolated position and dependence on Western aid and protection will be exploited by the Communists in their long-term campaign designed to weaken Western determination to maintain Allied rights in West Berlin, force the West to deal with East Germany, exclude Western influences from the city, and undercut its political and economic strength. The Communists hope to undermine the will of the population to resist and thus bring West Berlin under complete Communist control, either as a "free city" or in some other manner.

### Character of Communist Threat

**Berlin is a trump card in Moscow's strategy to gain recognition for East Germany. In its**

note of 27 November 1958 to the Western Allies, the Kremlin asserted that "the most correct and natural solution" to the Berlin problem would be to unify the city and incorporate it into East Germany. As a "concession," however, the Soviet Union offered to underwrite the creation of a demilitarized "free city" of West Berlin from which all Western "subversive" activities would be eliminated.

Moscow asserted its intention of turning over to the East Germans those remaining occupation functions it now exercises, if its proposals should be unacceptable to the Western powers. The USSR added, however, that no changes would be made in present controls over Allied military transport for six months.



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PART III

## PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 12

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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provided the Western governments did not seek "complications."

During this period the Kremlin can try to exploit divergent Western estimates of the importance of maintaining a position in West Berlin by force and of continuing to refuse recognition to East Germany, and continue its war of nerves against West Berlin citizens.


Allied Military Position

The Allied garrison in West Berlin consists of only 6,626 combat troops and some 2,500 service personnel; there are also some 14,000 West German police there. In East Berlin, on the other hand--apart from Soviet personnel attached to the Kommandatura at Karlshorst--there is an East German force of some 18,000 security police of various types, backed by a 10,000-man workers' militia. Within ten miles of the city there are some 30,000 Soviet and 16,000 East German soldiers, as well as 6,450 security police.

Allied military forces in West Berlin are almost completely dependent on external sources of supply. Their line of communications extends across East German territory and is subject to Communist interference at any time.

Moscow has already made certain moves toward turning over access control to East German authorities and appears to have actually transferred

its function of dealing with Allied personnel in East Berlin. It is also preparing to move its Berlin Kommandatura from Karlshorst to some nearby point outside the city. East German personnel have appeared alongside Soviet officials checking Allied documentation at the railroad and highway checkpoints and others are reportedly being trained to take over access



control duties. When controls are turned over, the East Germans may be phased into their new duties in order to test Western determination at each stage of the transfer.

Interference with Allied surface and air access need not be overt. Railroad access is particularly vulnerable, since all rail facilities are East German and all locomotives and train crews of Allied military

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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trains are supplied by the Ulbricht regime. There are many means of harassment, some outwardly minuscule but nonetheless effective, that could interfere with access but which would not lend themselves to effective Western retaliation or protest.

East Germany has already challenged the Allied right to use the air corridors and is likely to reiterate its demands for control. Without resorting to direct use of force, the Communists could make Allied flights to Berlin a hazardous proposition by means of electronic interference or by crowding the air corridors with planes.

Harassment of Civilian Supply

West German traffic has been highly vulnerable to harassment, and Bonn has heretofore been reluctant to resort to reprisals. West Berlin is almost entirely dependent on Western sources of supply for its population of 2,200,000 and for its booming industry. In 1957 approximately 39 percent of freight from the West to the city, including 65 percent of its foodstuffs, was carried by truck, mainly on the Helmstedt autobahn; 61 percent of outgoing freight went by truck. Railroads carried approximately 34 percent of incoming shipments and hauled out some 15 percent, while canal barges accounted for a corresponding 26 and 23 percent. Only a small proportion of West Berlin's supplies come from East Germany, notably brown-coal briquettes for heating, some construction materials, and certain perishable foodstuffs.

Civilian travelers and freight move along the autobahn and three other designated highways. The Berlin-Helmstedt railroad line carries the greatest number of passengers and the

bulk of the freight transported by rail. Barges move through the Mittelland Canal and Havel River system or via the Elbe-Havel route.

Civilian traffic, other than by air, is completely under East German control. West German nationals en route to or from Berlin must present passports or identity cards but have not yet been required to obtain visas. West Berliners show their identity cards.

Civilian traffic could be subjected to a large variety of harassments, including physical interference, delays, taxation, or requirements for more documents. Generally, there would be nothing the West could do to prevent these harassments or to retaliate in an effective way. West German economic sanctions could be used but would not be sufficient to stop a determined Communist initiative.

Civilian Air Access

Three Western civil airlines (Pan American, British European Airways, and Air France) use the air corridors under safety guarantees from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), with West Berlin's Tempelhof airport serving as the terminal. East Germany has already claimed that such aircraft have no right to fly through the corridors without its permission and have charged that they often carry illegal goods. If the Kremlin remove its representatives from the BASC, these airlines would have to operate without air safety guarantees or deal directly with the East Germans, which would mean further demands such as the right to inspect manifests.

East German interference with civilian flights to West Berlin would be designed, among other objectives, to put an end to the transportation of refugees,

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 February 1959

a long-sought objective. Such a step would seriously interfere with the use of West Berlin as an asylum for East Germans. More than half of all refugees from East Germany make their escape through Berlin. The percentage rose to 64 percent during June, July, and August 1958.

Harassment of West Berlin

Current Soviet tactics in the war of nerves against West Berlin have emphasized a "soft" approach, advertising the prospect of closer and "more natural" economic relations with East Germany. The USSR and East Germany have declared they are ready to place orders for industrial goods with the city's enterprises and undertake deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs. These orders would be designed to lay the groundwork for West Berlin's eventual economic assimilation.

The Communists could stop the shipment of East German goods to West Berlin, although this measure alone would have only a limited effect.

In connection with the West Berlin election of 7 December, in which the Communists received less than 2 percent of the vote, East Germans threatened certain West Berliners with reprisals if they did not support the Socialist Unity (Communist) party's electoral campaign. German employees of Allied missions were warned they would be blacklisted or worse if East Germany took over the whole city.

The East Germans have already taken steps to separate their transport system from West Berlin's and to eliminate their remaining dependence on transportation facilities in the Western sectors. The Communist ability to harass transportation to and within West

Berlin will increase as improvements are made in the railroad and canal bypass rings.

Measures to isolate West Berlin from the transport nets, although they would entail adverse economic consequences for East Germany, would be designed to limit travel from East Germany to the Western sectors, thereby sharply restricting the flight of refugees, and making it more difficult for the weary East Germans to view the West's "show window." East German authorities have already instituted measures to bar access and, if internal tensions increase, further controls are likely to be imposed. Restrictions are being put into effect to halt East German attendance at the "Green Week" agricultural fair in West Berlin, which in the past has been attended by more than 100,000 of Ulbricht's subjects.

It would be extremely difficult for the East Germans to seal off the Western sectors completely. The border passes through streets, squares, woodlands, fields, and lakes, and along canals. There are also several Western enclaves in East Zone territory. The East German police, border guards, and workers' militiamen could be posted at strategic points, but it would be impossible to seal the dividing line effectively. Instead, the Communists are likely to continue their tactics of intimidation, infiltration, and harassment.

Western Retaliation

The West has limited capability, short of force, to prevent continued Communist encroachments. There are no longer opportunities to retaliate against East German traffic passing through West Berlin. West Berlin must count on the Federal Republic for support, and Bonn has been highly

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 February 1959.

reluctant to take steps necessary to deter Communist harassment. Apart from cutting off steel and coke shipments, these steps could include severing East German shipments through Hamburg--a step which would arouse vigorous resistance from West German business circles.

American officials in Berlin report a "steadfast" public confidence in the Western powers, particularly the United States. Recalling their 1948 experiences, Berliners feel that a firm Western reaction will be sufficient to cause Moscow to reconsider any blockade plans.

[REDACTED] The indications of seriousness have been revealed in West Berlin business circles, and there has been some movement of valuables and belongings out of West Berlin.

As this uncertainty concerning the future continues, the economic situation in West Berlin is likely to show progressive deterioration. Any substantial decline in orders for West Berlin firms would result in an increase in unemployment and a weakening of the West Berlin economy.

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OCI NO. 0488/58

12 February 1959

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

12 February 1959

PART II (continued)

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


Page 4

FLIGHT OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY . . . . . Page 5,

Defections from East Germany, although down 22 percent from 1957, continued at a high rate throughout 1958, when over 204,000 persons fled, most of them to West Berlin, in reaction to the increasingly repressive policies of the Ulbricht regime. The total number of escapees from East Germany has reached approximately 2,350,000 since 1949. In addition to the loss of skilled workers, technicians, and managers, a very large increase in the defection of doctors, scientists, and teachers has created serious problems.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

12 February 1959

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FLIGHT OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY

Defections from East Germany although down 22 percent from 1957 continued at a high rate throughout 1958, when over 304,000 persons fled in reaction to the increasingly repressive policies of the Ulbricht regime. The total number of escapees from East Germany to West Berlin and West Germany has reached approximately 2,-

350,000 since 1949; this loss of personnel makes unlikely any rapid increase in economic development. In addition to the loss of skilled workers, technicians, and managers, a very large increase in the defection of doctors, scientists, and teachers has created serious problems.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 2 of 12

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY


12 February 1958

By increasing internal controls, the regime succeeded in early 1958 in reducing the number of refugees. The exodus, nevertheless, rose last summer to a high figure, including a large number of intellectuals, forcing the regime to make certain concessions, notably to doctors and small shopkeepers.

The authorities in Bonn estimate that there is but one doctor per 1,700 persons in East Germany, compared with one per 750 in West Germany; 1,243 doctors, dentists, and veterinarians fled in 1958, an increase of almost 300 percent over 1957. It is reported that doctors from other satellites may be called in to help staff some East German institutions. To alleviate the shortage of teachers, the call has gone out to

ers and farm workers, 350,000 skilled workers and craftsmen, 33,000 persons in the technical professions, and more than 350,000 children have fled. The majority of the refugees are under 40, a

## EAST GERMAN REFUGEES TO WEST GERMANY



Note: Figures include only those entering through internal West German refugee channels.

High percentage of them of military age (18-35).

References to shortages of agricultural labor have appeared in numerous reports, and East Zone publications are urging women to work a few hours daily on the farm or in the factory. Almost 10,000 farmers fled last year, largely because of the intensification of pressures on the private peasant.

The loss of some 11,000 engineers in the last five years, including 3,345 in 1958, has also had an adverse effect on the regime's ambitious plans. The chairman of the party economic commission, dismayed at the flight of the intelligentsia, expressed anxiety that the loss of technical and scientific personnel would hinder the chemical industry, which is designed to become one of the pillars of the East German economy.

## BREAKDOWN OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES BY OCCUPATION

| OCCUPATION                    | 1957   | 1958   |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|
| MINISTRY & MANAGEMENT         | 51,300 | 52,370 |
| TRADE & TRANSPORT             | 51,470 | 52,700 |
| SKILLED WORKERS               | 51,400 | 52,400 |
| HOUSEWIVES                    | 51,300 | 52,000 |
| ADMINISTRATIVE                | 51,300 | 52,100 |
| HOUSEHOLD & HEALTH SERVICES   | 51,300 | 52,200 |
| ADMINISTRATION & AMUSEMENTS   | 51,300 | 52,300 |
| TECHNICAL PROFESSIONS         | 51,300 | 52,400 |
| ARTS                          | 51,300 | 52,500 |
| HOUSEWORKERS                  | 51,300 | 52,600 |
| (HOUSEHOLD, CHURCH, & OTHERS) | 51,300 | 52,700 |

young workers and housewives to volunteer for training to replace some of the elementary-school teachers who fled in 1958.

The flight of personnel has also had a deleterious effect on some sectors of the economy. During the 1948-58 period, more than 123,000 farm-

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PART VI

WFOPS DIV. PUBLISHED

Page 2 of 2

SNIE 100-2-59  
24 February 1959

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SPECIAL  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE  
NUMBER 100-2-59

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION  
REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY

UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT  
REF ID: A67471

Submitted by the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
and all intelligence organizations participated in the  
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency  
and the intelligence organizations of the Department of  
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff

Concurred in by the  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
on 24 February 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intel-  
ligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant  
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the  
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart-  
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,  
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the  
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations;  
and the Director of the National Security Agency. The  
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and  
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ab-  
stained the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Date 7/9/93  
BRF 93-3

## PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet objectives and tactics with respect to negotiation over Berlin and Germany, the likelihood of Soviet turnover of access controls to the East German regime, and Bloc reactions to certain Western responses to this action.

### THE ESTIMATE

#### I. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS IN NEGOTIATION

1. We continue to believe that Moscow has raised the Berlin issue at this time because of a variety of related factors, some bearing on the consolidation of the Communist position in Eastern Europe, others on weakening the Western Alliance. Specifically, we believe that Soviet objectives include the reduction and eventual elimination of the disruptive influence which West Berlin and the presence there of Western troops exerts on the East German regime (GDR), the raising of the internal and international prestige of that regime, the fostering of discord among the NATO Allies, the limitation of West German armament and the prevention of a West German nuclear capability, an early summit meeting, and the eventual neutralization of West Germany as an effective member of the Western Alliance. Whatever may be the or-

der of priority among these objectives, it is clear that the Soviet leaders have now committed themselves on the issue of Berlin in an unprecedented manner.

2. As their repeated statements imply, the Soviet leaders probably have a genuine interest in negotiating with the West on the subject of Berlin, and indeed on the broader German problem. Their attitude reflects the high confidence they have in their bargaining position. While the Soviets wish to avoid general war, they almost certainly consider Soviet advances in nuclear capabilities as having brought about such an improvement in Soviet military strength that the West will hesitate increasingly before taking any action involving substantial risk of general war. The Soviets probably also hope that they can play upon differences of view among the Western Powers as to the extent of the risk that should be assumed in regard to Berlin. To pose a choice between actions risking war and actions tending to erode the Western position in Berlin must therefore be likely, in Soviet eyes, to make it more difficult for the Western Allies to maintain a united front.

<sup>1</sup>This estimate was prepared in response to a series of questions posed by the Department of State and therefore represents a specialized supplement to SNIE 100-13-58, "Soviet Objectives in the Berlin Crisis," 23 December 1958.

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3. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Western position in Berlin itself as overextended. They see West Berlin as a remote enclave within Bloc territory, the supply of whose civilian population is already subject to East German controls, and they view the Western garrisons as token forces whose right of land access is not specifically defined in any legal or political instrument. The Soviets probably believe that the facts of the access situation are such that, in the event of a turnover, the Allies would be obliged to acquiesce, to resort to a garrison airlift, or to initiate the use of force.

4. While we believe, as stated above, that the Soviets have high confidence in the bargaining position and their military posture in the Berlin situation, we also believe that the Soviets wish to avoid serious risk of general war. Hence, they will consider their military strength primarily as a factor increasing the likelihood of their obtaining advantages by political means, i.e., by negotiation. The Soviets will, in our opinion, continue to take an intransigent position and to believe that they can achieve important gains without making significant concessions. Nevertheless, we believe that they would prefer to avoid an actual confrontation of forces over the issue of access to Berlin lest events get out of control. On the other hand, they view the risk involved in confrontation as at least equally alarming to the Western side, and they will, until late in the game, play upon this risk, and the Western fear of it, as a principal counter in their maneuvering.

5. The Soviets probably also feel that in a negotiated settlement they could reduce some of the disadvantages to the Bloc which are inherent in the present situation. Any agreement which prejudiced the Western position in West Berlin and which tended to confirm the division of Germany and Europe would discourage the forces of discontent in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and impart greater stability to the Satellite regimes. Quite apart from the substance of any agreement that might be reached, the mere participation of the East Germans in

any negotiations would enhance the status of the Pankow regime. An agreement which forbade nuclear arms to West Germany would lessen the Soviet fear of the impact of a resurgent Germany, particularly on the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.

6. Finally it is possible, though on the whole we do not believe it likely, that the Soviet initiative on the Berlin issue reflects a desire to explore the possibilities of changing the situation in Central Europe on the basis of concessions on both sides. The Soviets have not offered concessions from their previous positions on Eastern Europe, German reunification or Berlin and prior to negotiations they would not be likely to indicate what concessions they might make. Their tactics in any negotiations on such a broad scale would vary according to the moves and reactions of the West.

7. In negotiating on Berlin, the Soviets would press for acceptance of their "free city" proposal and might introduce modifications in this scheme in the hope of securing Western acceptance for it. The minimum terms on which the Kremlin would be willing to call off the planned transfer of access controls to the GDR would probably be the establishment of official dealings between the GDR and the West, together with restrictions on propaganda and intelligence activities in West Berlin, and the flow of refugees through that city. The Soviets would estimate that any modification in Berlin's status and any other arrangements tending to imply Western recognition of the GDR would provide a precedent for further attacks upon the Western position in Berlin and a vital step toward achieving their larger objectives in Germany.

8. In negotiations on the broader German problem, the proposal for a peace treaty with a divided Germany would form the core of the Soviet position. In addition, the Soviets might propose that the Four Powers endorse direct negotiations between the "two Germanies" on the Communist-"confederation" plan. While Moscow probably would not expect to gain Western acceptance of these pro-

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posals, they would hope in negotiations to push the West in this direction with the particular view of extracting some concessions which would enhance the international standing of the GDR. Moreover, they would probably hope to engage the West in serious negotiations on certain features of the peace treaty proposal, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and the limitation of forces in Germany. But whatever their proposals, the Soviets would almost certainly continue to adhere to certain key positions. They would seek the substance of the conditions regarding Berlin mentioned above. In addition, the Soviets would almost certainly maintain their long-standing position that the problem of German reunification can only be solved by the "two Germanies," that this problem cannot be negotiated by the four former occupying powers, and that, at most, Four Power talks should seek to facilitate negotiations between the "two Germanies." They would insist that free elections on the territory of the GDR were not an acceptable means of achieving a unified German state and that a reunited Germany would not be free to join NATO.

9. While the Soviets have formally rejected the linking of Berlin and Germany with discussions of European security, they would probably enter such a negotiation, provided they were given parity of representation. They would be prepared to discuss disengagement and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear and missile fields. To the extent that such discussion touched on Berlin and Germany, they would probably insist on the substance of the conditions mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, and on the participation of the "two Germanies" in some appropriate form.

10. Whatever the scope of the negotiations which the Western Powers were willing to entertain, it is likely that the Soviets would at some stage attempt to make their proposals more attractive by modifying some of the positions they have heretofore taken. For example, they might offer to place a "free

city" of West Berlin under UN administration. They might agree to UN guarantee of the access routes. It is within the realm of possibility that they might agree to the inclusion of East Berlin in the "free city" arrangement in some fashion, but we believe this to be extremely unlikely.

11. There will hang over all negotiations the threat that control of the access to West Berlin will be handed over to the East Germans if some agreement satisfactory to Moscow is not reached. We do not believe that a turnover will be undertaken prior to 27 May, or that it would take place at a later date if negotiations were under way or impending, unless the Soviets came to believe that progress through negotiation was not possible. The Kremlin probably conceives of itself as able to confront the Western Powers with an unpleasant but inescapable alternative, either to agree to or acquiesce in changes in the present situation which would lead to an erosion of the Western position in Berlin and West Germany, or to face substantial risk of war in order to maintain what would appear to the public at large as minor procedural arrangements at the frontiers.

## II. THE QUESTION OF TURNOVER

12. The question arises of whether, if talks fail to materialize or veer toward a stalemate or collapse, there exist any means by which the Western Powers could deter the Soviet Union from turning over access controls, or persuade it to make the turnover in form but not in fact. It is our view that if negotiations failed to produce results acceptable to the USSR, only a conviction that the West intended to use force would cause the Soviets to reconsider turning over access controls to the East Germans. A principal factor would be the Soviet assessment of Western, particularly US, intentions. The Soviets might believe that the West would use force to probe their intentions, but be uncertain as to how far the West would go in the use of force. Or they might believe that the West would use whatever force proved necessary, even if such use of force led to general war.

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13. In the event that the Soviets were convinced that the West intended to use force to probe Soviet intentions, but were uncertain as to how far the West would go in the use of force, we believe that the odds are about even that the USSR would not turn over to the GDR complete control of land, water, and air access to Berlin. On the one hand, they would fear that local clashes would lead to such an involvement of prestige and emotions that the situation could get out of control and result in grave risk of general war. On the other hand, they would realize that they had local military superiority. They would doubt that Western leaders would press the use of force to the point of seriously risking general war. Moreover, it would be difficult to convince Moscow that the Allied governments were united in their determination to use any force, or that they had the support of Western public opinion.

14. The USSR would almost certainly back away from a full turnover of access controls if it were convinced that the Western Powers were determined to use whatever degree of force was necessary to maintain access to Berlin free of GDR controls, even if such use of force led to general war. But it would be most difficult to convince the Soviet leadership that this was so. In the absence of manifest preparations for war on an extended scale they would doubt the intent of Western leaders to take such risks. Even in the face of specific warnings and military preparations the Soviets would probably remain skeptical of the ability of Western leaders to obtain public support for resort to general war, particularly if the Soviets could make the issue appear to be merely one of whether Soviet or East German authorities were to check Allied credentials at the access points.

15. If they decided to avoid a showdown over the question of access controls, the Soviet leaders would still seek to avoid the appearance of retreat. They might withdraw their garrisons and officials from East Berlin amid great fanfare without relinquishing their responsibilities over the access routes to West Berlin. Or, while making formal announce-

ment of the turnover, they might in fact retain Soviet personnel at the check points to deal with Western military movements.

16. If the Soviets turned over all access controls, they would probably seek to head off an abrupt Western reaction by prior assurance that free access to West Berlin would be maintained by the GDR and might intimate that the East Germans would not interfere with Allied military movements despite the refusal of convoy commanders to show their credentials.

### III. SOVIET REACTIONS TO VARIOUS WESTERN COURSES OF ACTION

#### Western Acquiescence

17. Should the Allies elect to acquiesce in the turnover of controls, the East Germans initially would probably be correct and unprovocative in the operation of the checkpoints. This would be true whether or not the West asserted the "agent" theory of continuing Soviet responsibility for free access.

18. However, once the Western Powers were firmly committed to dealing with the East Germans on the access issue, Bloc authorities would make political capital of that fact. Particularly for the benefit of the West Germans, they would stress the contention that Western acquiescence constituted *de facto* recognition of the East German regime and acceptance of the "two Germanies" concept. Sooner or later, perhaps in connection with the tenth anniversary of the GDR in October 1959, propaganda pressures would probably be augmented by harassing moves aimed at inducing the withdrawal of Western garrisons, expanding the area of dealings with the GDR, and at persuading the West Berliners that their safety and livelihood depended on reaching an understanding with the GDR. Such harassment might be minor at first, but in due course the Western Powers would be forced to choose between accepting the progressive erosion of their position in Berlin or taking a strong stand on the basis of a legal position weaker than it is now.

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### A Garrison Airlift

19. Should the Western Powers decide, after the turnover had taken place, to supply their small garrisons entirely by air, Soviet and East German authorities would probably not initially interfere with force. Given the small tonnages involved, a garrison airlift could almost certainly be carried out by visual flight methods and the Communists would be unable to effectively hamper Western military air traffic by jamming controls and communications. Extensive physical harassment of such an airlift in its early stages probably would be considered politically inadvisable, and the Communists would instead concentrate on making the Western Powers appear ridiculous for using an expensive airlift merely to avoid dealing with GDR officials. The Communists would sooner or later probably commence direct physical harassment of the garrison airlift. Such harassment might include flying their own aircraft in the corridors, firing antiaircraft weapons in the corridors, attempting to force down aircraft alleged to be engaged in intelligence activities, and the like.

20. It is also likely that the Soviets would formally withdraw the guarantee of safety of Western civilian flights through the air corridors to Berlin. They would justify this act on the ground that sovereignty over these corridors resided in the GDR. In its turn Pankow could refuse to assume responsibility for the safety of these flights unless the Western Powers accepted an East German representative in the Berlin Air Safety Center. Without adequate guarantees the Western airlines would probably refuse to fly to Berlin and if the air connection to Berlin, including the evacuation of refugees, were to be maintained, Western military aviation would have to assume this responsibility.

21. If these pressures failed to induce the West to negotiate on Berlin, the Soviets would probably undertake some harassment of civilian surface access from the West to West Berlin. By such means as raising tolls and introducing arbitrary procedures they could make it difficult for the West Berlin economy

to function. They would probably expect that such low key tactics would in time produce growing pressure in West Berlin and West Germany for an accommodation. They would probably not initially impose a total blockade for fear of the impact on world public opinion.

### Economic Sanctions

22. An embargo of all trade between the NATO Powers and the GDR would create an important dislocation both of the East German economy and of East German-Bloc trade. The total commodity trade between the GDR and the NATO countries is on the order of \$580 million a year, about two-thirds of which is between West Germany and the GDR. This trade is about 17 percent of the GDR's total commodity trade. This dislocation would be greater if the NATO countries refused to charter ships to the Bloc and if the use of water routes through West Germany to East Germany were denied. Initially, the application of sanctions would lead either to a considerable increase in unemployment in East Germany and a general failure of the GDR to meet its export commitments to the Bloc, or to a Soviet crash aid program in behalf of the GDR together with some local disorganization of Bloc production and trade.

23. Economic sanctions to be effective would have to be applied by the NATO countries principally involved, particularly West Germany. Sanctions would be considerably weakened if other free world countries filled the gap or if free world trade with the GDR were rerouted through other Bloc countries. It is doubtful that unity of action among all the countries concerned could be achieved. As indicated, economic sanctions would injure the GDR and the Bloc. We do not believe, however, that the threat of such sanctions alone would prevent the Soviets from proceeding with turnover, or that their imposition after turnover would cause the Soviets to reverse themselves. They could be an important factor if associated with other means of pressure.

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The Use of Force to Maintain Access<sup>2</sup>

24. If, after the Soviets had turned over access controls, they were actually confronted with a Western effort to maintain road access to Berlin by force, Soviet and East German authorities would almost certainly feel compelled to react vigorously. The nature of the reaction would doubtless depend, to some degree, on the way the situation had developed by the time the issue was faced. As a general proposition, however, we believe that if confronted with a convoy escorted by a token force, the Soviets, probably through the use of East Germans, would almost certainly try to bar its passage by means short of active combat, i.e., by road obstructions, demolitions, a show of force, etc. If, however, these means

<sup>2</sup>The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the reasoning presented in paragraphs 24, 25, and 26 is valid only insofar as the Soviets are convinced that the actions they take will not gravely risk general war. He further believes that the Soviets will estimate that any active combat between Western and Soviet or GDR forces will gravely risk general war; and, therefore, they will not permit the situation to develop to the point where active armed combat occurs.

In support of this, he cites the following from NIE 11-4-58, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963," "... we believe that the Soviets would seek to prevent any crisis from developing in such a way as to leave themselves only a choice between accepting a serious reverse and taking action which would substantially increase the likelihood of general war." (Paragraph 105, page 29)

In order to establish the perspective of the above, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would introduce paragraphs 24, 25, and 26 with a lead-in paragraph substantially as follows:

"As we have said in paragraphs 12-14 above, the Soviets would be skeptical of Western intentions to use force or of Western ability to obtain public support for a resort to general war. However, we believe that the Soviets, realizing the risk of general war, would be extremely unlikely to allow the situation to develop where active combat between Western and Soviet or GDR forces was on the verge of becoming an actuality. Rather we believe that they would almost certainly accept a reverse before they would run the grave risk which could result from actual armed engagement. Paragraphs 24, 25, and 26 below discuss the situation under which the Soviets have decided to accept this grave risk."

were not successful we believe they would resort to active combat. It is conceivable, however, that Bloc authorities would allow one or more such convoys to get through while an effort was made to convoke a high level conference.

25. If a heavily armed and sizable task force had entered the GDR, the East Germans and Soviets would probably first demand the immediate withdrawal of the force and a peaceful settlement. But if this demand were not complied with, we believe the Soviets would commit the forces they considered necessary to defeat and drive out the Allied units in a minimum of time. The Communist leaders would probably believe it imperative to demonstrate effectively the inviolability of Bloc territory because of the danger that even limited and temporary Western success on East German soil might lead to defections among GDR troops, or to widespread civil disturbances in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, not to mention the blow dealt by such successes to Soviet prestige throughout the world. The Soviet leaders would thus have strong incentives to defeat the Western effort and they undoubtedly would possess high confidence that they could do so with locally available Soviet forces. They would recognize that engagement of a Western task force would involve substantial risk of widened hostilities, but they would probably not have allowed the situation to get to this point if they had been convinced that it would result in general war.

26. Throughout any military crisis over ground access to Berlin, particularly if a confrontation of forces was imminent or had occurred, the USSR would almost certainly conduct an energetic diplomatic and propaganda offensive designed to limit the area and character of the conflict and to bring about a negotiated settlement. If it could not achieve a settlement, the USSR might end the crisis in a manner involving some loss of face on its part, lest matters get out of hand, but the greater likelihood is that it would take all necessary action to force the withdrawal of any Western forces which had entered the GDR. In these circumstances, there would be great danger of an expansion of the conflict.

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

8 March 1959

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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..... Page 1




USSR PREPARES TO VACATE EAST BERLIN ..... Page 2

Soviet preparations to withdraw military and civilian organizations from East Berlin have reached such an advanced stage that the city could be virtually emptied of Soviet personnel on short notice. Construction deadlines for new buildings such as barracks and offices outside East Berlin to which the Russians plan to move remain set for 25 May.

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
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

8 March 1989



USSE PREPARES TO VACATE EAST BERLIN

Soviet preparations to withdraw military and civilian organizations from East Berlin have reached an advanced stage. There are extensive packing ac-


tivities in the compound at Karlshorst, and a new headquarters is being built between Bernau and Wandlitz See, a few miles north of Berlin.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

8 March 1959



to move have been noted principally in the Soviet State Security (KGB) units in Karlshorst, which is the largest organization in the compound. In addition, the principal Soviet hospital in East Berlin has been almost vacated, and preparations are being made to close the school, trade mission, and other installations.

The advanced preparations indicate that the Russians could be ready in a very short time to evacuate virtually all their personnel from the city. Construction deadlines for new buildings outside East Berlin, to which the Russians plan to move, such as barracks and offices, remain set at around 25 May.

In addition to the KGB, other Soviet organizations which are believed to exercise close control over the East Germans are involved. Since these organizations will probably be quartered at Bernau, Strausberg, or Fuesstenwalde--all of which are near East Berlin--Soviet officials will be able to continue close observance of East German activities.

One report indicated that the Karlshorst compound would be used by the East German Army in the future. Such a move would be symbolic of the increased authority of the East German regime.

If control over East Berlin is transferred to East Germany,

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 March 1955

the sector border between East and West Berlin will for all practical purposes become an international frontier, and Allied access rights to the entire city, spelled out in a quadripartite agreement, will be retained only through East German sufferance. East Germany would probably assume ac-

cess controls at the same time, leaving West Berlin subject to being cut off completely. Refugees would find it more difficult to go to West Berlin, and, if the already stringent security controls were tightened further, the refugee flight through the city would for all practical purposes be stopped. [REDACTED]

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 March 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet and Other Reactions to Various US Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet and other reactions to four US courses of action in the event of failure of negotiations in the Berlin crisis and Soviet interference with Western access. The courses of action are: (a) a substantial effort to reopen ground access to West Berlin by local action; (b) a substantial effort to reopen air access; (c) reprisals against the Communists in other areas; and (d) preparations for general war.

INTRODUCTION

1. The consequences of any US course of action on the international scene will always depend on the context of events

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within which the US makes its move, and on the manner, style, and timing of the action. In the present Berlin crisis there has already been extensive maneuver on both sides. The issues at stake have been defined in various ways, ranging from the relatively narrow question of Berlin's status to the wider problem of European and even of world security. Propaganda and diplomacy are continuously active. Neither side has finally defined its own position, while it tests as far as it may the strength and resolution of the adversary. Given the importance and dangers implicit in the whole complex of issues surrounding the Berlin problem, the mood and even the intentions of the protagonists may shift as the crisis is prolonged.

2. This being the situation, an estimate of the consequences of certain US courses of action in the Berlin crisis presents peculiar difficulties. It is impossible to predict the particular context of events within which these actions might be taken, and we think it important to point out that an estimate made without knowledge of this context might be seriously misleading. A US move made at a particular juncture of events, or executed

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in a particular manner, might have consequences altogether different from the same move made under different circumstances, or in a different manner. We have therefore not tried to make a detailed estimate, but instead have attempted to describe, in a general way, some of the limits within which we believe the consequences of US action would be likely to fall, and to explain some of the factors which would be likely to determine these consequences.

3. In particular, Soviet and free world reactions to the Western measures listed above would be influenced by the manner in which negotiations had failed as well as by the underlying reasons for this outcome. Much would depend upon whether the Soviet or Western side seemed to be responsible for the final breaking off of negotiations. If the whole chain of negotiations had been run through, and the breakdown occurred at the summit, international tension would be markedly greater than if it came at the ministerial level or lower. Incidents arising from harassment or interference with Allied traffic by Soviet or GDR authorities

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might have heightened tensions and influenced world opinion for or against one side or the other. Similar effects would result if either side had begun military preparations. Also, the skill with which the Western measures were justified to the world would influence both Soviet behavior and free world opinion.

4. It is clear that the whole array of circumstances prevailing when the courses of action under discussion are put into play cannot be known in advance. However, in order to narrow the range of uncertainty the following general factors, applying to all four cases, are assumed to be operative:

(a) At the time when negotiations break down the Western Powers will have made statements indicating that they intend to maintain their rights of unhampered access to Berlin by force if necessary. Their public posture will be such that resort to force will be clearly preparation implicit as a next step. Some/manifesting readiness for war will have been undertaken.

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(b) It is recognized that the Soviets and GDR will almost certainly not deny access to Berlin outright. Instead, they will simply be making access subject to certain conditions, beginning presumably with replacement of Soviet GDR controllers at checkpoints. Thus, the Western justification for resort to force will have to rest on the West's own determination that one or another requirement governing access is in effect a denial of access.

COURSE A: A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action\* -- defined as the dispatch of a reinforced US battalion, with forces up to a reinforced division with tactical air support in readiness if required. The force will proceed toward the opposite end of the autobahn taking over control points as required. The force will not fire unless fired upon but will deploy off the autobahn if necessary to meet the situation.

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\* See SNIE 100-2-59, especially Paragraphs 25 and 26, for an estimate of the Soviet reaction in this case.

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5. Once the Soviets were actually confronted with such a task force, they might estimate that to oppose it with force would set off a train of events which would end in general war. If they so concluded they would either seek the advantages of surprise and the initiative by launching a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North America, or they would decide not to oppose the Western force at all and, while appealing to world opinion and the UN, would abandon for the time being their effort to impose the conditions on access which had led to the Western action. We do not believe, however, that the appearance of a US force on the autobahn, without very extensive additional military and psychological preparations, would lead the Soviets to the conclusion that the US was willing to proceed to general war.

6. Instead, Moscow would probably estimate that the US lacked the military means to deal effectively on a local basis with the Soviet forces in the GDR, and that the US, rather than increase the scale of military involvement up to and including general war, would prefer to make concessions to the Soviet-demands

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on Berlin. We believe, therefore, that the most likely Soviet response would be to resist the US division with force. Soviet resistance would be aimed at driving the invader from GDR soil while minimizing the risk of expanding hostilities.

7. In this action Moscow could limit itself to use of the East German Army. This would have the advantage of avoiding a direct confrontation between Soviet and Western forces, and it would lend plausibility to the claim of the GDR to sovereignty and independence. On the other hand, there would be definite risks in the use of East German forces. The political reliability of some of these troops may be regarded by the Soviets as uncertain and they might fear the possibility of defection among them. If the East Germans suffered a defeat or a large-scale defection, there might be flash risings in the GDR and the possibility of these spreading to Poland or Hungary, or both. We believe that the Soviets might attempt initially to use East German forces for setting up road blocks and other obstructive action, but that once fighting had broken out they would feel obliged to use their own forces along with East Germans.

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8. In the greater part of the non-Communist world there would almost certainly be a strongly adverse reaction to a substantial Western effort to reopen ground access to Berlin by local action. This reaction would stem primarily from fear of war, and from disapproval of the Western resort to armed force. In the more important countries of NATO, public reaction would probably be mixed, and would depend to some degree on how far Soviet obstructive actions appeared designed merely to enforce technical requirements for GDR supervision of Western access to Berlin, rather than to isolate Berlin from the West and communize the city. If the latter case were established there would be considerable public support for the Western countermove. Should the Western troops succeed in opening the road without violating adjacent GDR territory, the action would probably be generally approved, but should there be fighting in which Western troops deployed widely, many even in Western countries would believe that the West had initiated aggression.

9. We believe that most of the NATO governments would support the US move, providing they were convinced that the issue

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at stake clearly exceeded a mere technicality. Most other governments, however, and especially those of neutralist countries, would oppose. The matter would almost certainly be raised in the UN. Once in the UN General Assembly (assuming that the Security Council could not act), a resolution might be passed calling for a withdrawal of forces. This might have the effect of conceding nominal East German control of Western access to Berlin.

COURSE B: A substantial effort to reopen air access -- Western action would be graduated depending upon the degree of Soviet and GDR interference. If there is harassment (e.g., barrage balloons) which endangers the safety of Western aircraft peaceably transiting the corridor, Western combat aircraft will enter the corridors to come to their assistance.

10. We believe that the USSR would probably refrain from attacks on Western aircraft with fighters and antiaircraft fire, inasmuch as the USSR would thereby appear before the world as the initiator of hostilities which could lead to general war. The Soviets

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might attempt to interfere with Western aircraft by less direct means: "accidents" might occur and there would probably be ECM interference. Western aircraft might be fired on, however, if they flew outside of the air corridors. The main Soviet reaction would be directed to political exploitation of this situation, especially in the UN. The Soviets would calculate that the Western action could not be sustained for a long period without seriously adverse political effects, even in the Western countries.

11. The extent to which the protection of Western air traffic would be condemned or approved by free world opinion would depend in large part on what provocation the USSR had given, that is, on how specific its threats to air traffic had been. Also, far wider approval would be found for this action if the Communists were simultaneously attempting to deny all ground access. Even so, the fact that the US had resorted to military action would tend to alienate some sections of world public opinion.

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COURSE C: Reprisals against the Communists in the form of  
tripartite naval controls on Soviet Bloc merchant shipping --

Delays will be imposed for inspection of documents, cargo and health conditions, or search for illegally carried personnel. This will be done in parts and on the high seas. Execution will be by US, British, and French naval forces. Collaboration of other countries in their ports and national waters will be sought.

12. The Soviets would reason that the effects of such an interruption on the Bloc economy would not be immediate, and that these need not therefore determine their short-term actions in the Berlin crisis. They would probably not therefore desist immediately from whatever interference they had imposed on access to Berlin. They would seek to make maximum propaganda capital out of the Western action, warning that it had brought international tension to a new height and was, in fact, virtually an act of war. They would undertake whatever legal recourse was open to them in international forums including the UN. They would probably take similar reprisals against the shipping of the three powers in Bloc ports and national waters,

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enlisting the collaboration of other states if they could. They might also attempt to detain or take custody of merchant shipping on the high seas near to their own coasts and ports. Finally, they might declare certain waters, such as the Black and Baltic seas, closed to ships of the three powers.

to  
13. Free world reaction/such restrictions on Bloc trade would probably be generally adverse. Such measures would be viewed as exclusively retaliatory actions which did not contribute to negotiation and settlement of the questions at issue, although they would probably win far wider support if they came at a time when West Berlin was under full blockade. Those NATO powers which carry on substantial seaborne trade with the Bloc would be most reluctant to accept the sacrifices entailed in the interruption of that trade. Free world opinion generally would be inclined to regard such reprisals as leading to a further deterioration of East-West relations.

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COURSE D: Preparations for general war.-- Measures of partial mobilization to be taken would include unit deployments, increased emphasis on readiness of units, on increased alert posture, and heightened civil defense activity. Public awareness of these activities is assumed.

14. The extent to which these measures were effective in convincing the Soviet leaders that the West was determined to go to war over interference with its rights of access to Berlin would depend less on these measures themselves than on what was said concerning them. The Soviets would probably be convinced of the Western intention actually to go to war only if the measures were explained to the Western publics as having that meaning. If the USSR was convinced that the West was prepared to wage general war rather than permit the loss of its rights in Berlin, the Soviet leaders would almost certainly reach a negotiated settlement which respected basic Western interests. They would still come to this, however, only by a series of steps in negotiation, hoping that the gradual easing of their position would weaken Western resolve and unity and permit the USSR to avoid the appearance of backing down abruptly.

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15. If the military preparations indicated were accompanied by credible statements by the highest leaders that the Western Powers intended to go to general war over the Berlin issue, there would probably be widespread alarm and dismay among the people of the Atlantic community and profound disapproval in most of the rest of the world. There would be demands in the UN for action to halt the trend toward war. Yet these would not necessarily be the permanent or decisive reactions. To the extent to which NATO countries recognized that the issue posed over Berlin really involved the defense of the free world, we believe that public opinion would accept the Western measures with firmness and resignation. This would be especially true if it were widely believed that large-scale military preparations held good promise of maintaining the essential Western position without actual resort to war. We cannot judge at this time whether such reactions would be likely to outweigh those of fear and opposition.

16. If military preparations and declarations of intent to go to general war had not produced a shift in the Soviet

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position and the Western Powers then issued an ultimatum demanding a redress of grievances, say within 24 hours, it seems to us impossible to predict the Soviet response with assurance. Confronted with such a public, clear-cut, and uncompromising challenge, the USSR would consider its prestige as a great power with its prestige at stake and would surely find it very difficult to back down. If the Soviet leaders considered their forces to be in an adequate state of readiness they might unleash a pre-emptive attack. Alternatively, they might make the concessions demanded. We consider the latter course the more likely, but we do not believe that the Western Powers could act with confidence on this assumption.

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TELETYPED INFORMATION REPORT

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| CLASSIFICATION<br><del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>  |             | DISSEMINATION CONTROLS<br>NOFORN   |   |
| TDCS   | DATE DISTR. | 6 April 1959   | PRECEDENCE<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE |
| COUNTRY<br>USSR/Germany  |             | PLACE ACQUIRED<br>This document has been<br>Germany to Berlin (April 1959)<br>the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of<br>Central Intelligence Agency. |   |
| SUBJECT<br>Soviet Official's Comments on the Berlin Situation  |             | REFERENCES   |   |
| DATE OF INFORMATION<br>Late March 1959   |             |  |   |
| APPRAISAL OF CONTENT (TENTATIVE)<br>3 and Opinion  |             |  |   |
| SOURCE EVALUATION (DEFINITIVE)<br>A fairly reliable East German Communist source (C), from a Soviet official in Berlin whom source has been on intimate terms with for some time.  |             |  |   |
| <p>A Soviet official stated that it is inconceivable and out of the question that the Berlin crisis would deteriorate to the point of war, because both sides possess the means to annihilate the other side. He did not rule out the possibility of localized conflicts, even in Germany. He alleged that the Soviets are considering, among other measures, an intermittent blockade of Berlin as a harassment measure. The Karlshorst compound is in the process of almost complete turnover to the Germans.</p> <p>Field Distribution: None.</p> <p>End of Message</p> |             |  |   |
| DISSEMINATION CONTROLS<br>NOFORN   |             | CLASSIFICATION<br><del>CONFIDENTIAL</del><br><del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>   |   |

TO: ACSL AF, NAVY, JCS, OSD, STATE, NSA, ONE, OGI, OGR, DD/I, OGI, CRR

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OCI NO. 1085.5.

30 April 1955

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

30 April 1980

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

THE PROBLEM OF WESTERN ACCESS TO BERLIN . . . . . Page 1

The Soviet Union has exploited the absence of a clear-cut agreement on access to Berlin to establish mechanisms which enable it to harass all forms of surface transportation to the city. East Germany has come to play a considerable role in the regulation of surface traffic, particularly West German. The Communists could readily block all surface routes by destroying bridges, overpasses, and canal locks. An airlift could supply Allied garrisons, even if Communist electronic measures against air navigational systems made all but visual flights impossible, but the West Berlin civilian population could not be sustained by such a limited airlift.

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PART III  
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

THE PROBLEM OF WESTERN ACCESS TO BERLIN


The Western powers' rights of access to Berlin derive from their participation in the defeat of Germany in World War II and the agreements reached with the USSR concerning the postwar occupation. These are embodied in a number of documents including a London agreement of September 1944 and an exchange of letters between President Truman and Stalin, and a verbal agreement between General Clay and Marshal Zhukov during the summer of 1945. The Paris Agreement of 1945 terminating the Berlin blockade is also relevant. There is, however, no single document signed by all four powers providing for unrestricted access to the city by surface and air. Allied rights are based on precedent and usage.

At the time of the Soviet-East German treaty of 1955 which granted "sovereignty" to East Germany, there was an exchange of letters between East German Foreign Minister Bolin and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Koria in which the USSR stated that it would "temporarily" retain control of Allied access to Berlin pending the conclusion of further agreements with the Allies. It is the Soviet contention that the USSR's planned peace treaty with East Germany will invalidate all Allied occupation agreements, including those governing control of access to West Berlin. This control

would then pass to the "sovereign" East German regime.

Road and Rail Access

The West's right to ground access to Berlin was established during a June 1945 meeting between General Clay, Marshal Zhukov, and a British representative. The memorandum of conver-



sation resulting from this meeting was never authenticated, however. The agreement has, in practice, been interpreted to mean that the Allies would submit to Soviet traffic regulations and document checks but not to inspection of vehicles or cargo. Zhukov stated at the

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meeting that he did not deny the right of Allied access, but that the Soviet Union would not "give a corridor." The agreement is vague enough to be open to honest differences of opinion by both sides and has given the USSR manifold opportunities to harass traffic.

All Allied road traffic must travel via the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn. There are three other routes open to non-Allied nationals, but 80 percent of all road traffic goes via Helmstedt. Some 37 percent of Berlin's imports and 37 percent of its exports by tonnage go by road. Of military interest is the fact that the 108-mile stretch in East Germany includes 47 bridges (the Elbe bridge is over 1,300 yards long, including 160 yards over water) and 31 overpasses. There are Allied, West German, Soviet, and East German barriers or checkpoints at each end.

After passing the Western checkpoints, Allied vehicles come to a barrier manned by East Germans which normally is raised automatically. Then comes the Soviet checkpoint, where the movement order--issued unilaterally by Allied military authorities--is stamped, but the delay is generally longer than would seem necessary. The Allied vehicle driver or convoy commander is given a small white form when he leaves the Soviet checkpoint. This is surrendered at another East German barrier--some 75 yards farther inside East Germany--which normally is raised without question.

The form appears to be no more than permission from the Russians to the East Germans to permit the vehicle to proceed. This procedure for passing through an East German - manned barrier gives the East Germans a foot in the door toward full control of access. When Allied

vehicles leave East Germany going east or west, the East Germans merely raise the barriers and no white form is involved. The Russians do, however, check the travel documents at their checkpoint.

All Allied rail traffic and all rail freight goes via the Marienborn-Berlin rail line, which roughly parallels the Helmstedt autobahn. There are five other international rail lines in use. Some 35 percent of West Berlin's imports and 31 percent of its exports, by tonnage, as well as 33 percent of Allied freight to the Berlin garrisons, are handled by rail. Allied trains while in East Germany are hauled by East German locomotives with East German crews.

The Allies operate 34 regularly scheduled trains per week, with the arrangements being made between West and East German railway officials. There are a considerable number of similar low-level trade and commercial agreements between the two railroad systems. There is only one checkpoint on the rail line, four miles from the actual border at Marienborn. Allied trains have no contact with East German officials; processing is handled by the Russians.

Air Access

The question of air access is the only one governed by a properly authenticated document. This was approved by the Allied Control Council in 1945 and updated in 1948. There are a number of points, however, which are not entirely clear: one is whether the Allies have exclusive or priority rights to the three air corridors. Thus far the Russians have, in general, appeared to recognize that the Allies have exclusive rights, since they have seldom used the corridors themselves.

The most pressing question is that of minimum and maximum

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altitudes. A maximum altitude of 10,000 feet was mentioned in a draft of the 1948 agreement, but did not appear in the final document. There is a 10,000-foot altitude limit within 20 miles of Berlin.

The air space around Berlin, known as the Berlin Control Zone, is administered by one of the two remaining quadripartite bodies: the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). The group administering Spandau Prison is the other such body. The BASC, located in West Berlin, coordinates traffic in and out of the three airfields in West Berlin and the one airfield just outside East Berlin but within the Berlin Control Zone. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union normally submits its flight plans to the BASC, as the Allies do; the USSR schedules its flights so as not to conflict with Allied flights.

In addition to military traffic, three civil air lines from the three Allies regularly operate to and from West Berlin. None of the navigational aids, such as beacons or radars, servicing the three corridors are in East Germany.

Air travel to Berlin is the only means of travel which is not subject to Communist control. This freedom made

possible the Berlin airlift; it also enables the Allies to transport East German refugees from West Berlin to West Germany.

The Allied garrisons could be supplied almost indefinitely by airlift if a surface blockade were enforced—even if the Communists jammed Allied air navigational aids, making all but visual flights impossible. An airlift could not, however, sustain the West Berlin civil population if surface access were denied.

Canal Traffic

Barge traffic via the extensive canal and river system is of considerable importance to West Berlin, although not to the Allies. Some 2,500 West German barges are licensed for international movement, and last year they carried some 25 percent of all freight in and out of West Berlin. All canals and locks in East Germany are controlled by the East Germans. As in the case of rail access, arrangements for barge traffic are made at a technical level between West and East German authorities. The canals were closed during the Berlin blockade, and since then the East Germans have from time to time harassed traffic by closing the locks "for repairs."

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PART III

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 May 1959

PART I  
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## FOREIGN MINISTERS' TALKS

Soviet moves in the second week of the Geneva foreign ministers' conference were designed to break up the West's package plan and to induce the Western ministers to discuss the Soviet peace treaty and Berlin proposals separately on terms most favorable to the USSR.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his speech on 18 May, developed the line used by Khrushchev in his speech two days earlier, accepting the Lenin Peace Prize. Gromyko said the Western package was "clearly unacceptable," but indicated willingness to discuss those parts dealing with European security and disarmament if they are separated from the "negative and unrealistic" proposals on Berlin and German reunification. He made it clear, however, that debate on a peace treaty and Berlin must precede consideration of all other questions.

The Soviet leaders probably hope their moves to detach the questions of European security and an arms-limitation zone from the Western package will tend to divide Britain from the United States and France in view of Prime Minister Macmillan's commitment, at the end of his Moscow visit, to discuss these questions separate from German reunification.

Gromyko has also attempted to probe for dissension among the Western powers by floating hints of readiness to discuss a separate or interim agreement on Berlin. After rejecting the Western proposals on Berlin "from beginning to end," he

urged the West to display a "sounder and more businesslike approach" and said the USSR is ready to work out a solution "together with the governments of the states concerned." He emphasized Moscow's readiness to consider Berlin and European security as separate and independent subjects for negotiation.

On the day following the widely publicized reports that the United States might consider an interim Berlin settlement if the USSR rejects the Western package plan, Gromyko, in a private talk with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, renewed the USSR's previous offers of three alternative solutions: (1) complete withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin; (2) addition of token Soviet forces to the Western garrisons; or (3) replacement of Western troops by neutral forces under United Nations authority.

Two high-ranking members of the Soviet delegation, in a private talk with an American official on 14 May, had suggested that token Soviet forces could be stationed in West Berlin along with Western troops. This idea was first advanced publicly by Khrushchev in his speech in East Berlin on 9 March.

Moscow's maneuvers to exploit any differences between Britain and the other Western powers were also reflected in Soviet propaganda. Pravda claimed on 17 May that the circulation by Reuters of a version of the West's package plan a day before it was formally

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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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introduced was an attempt by the British to "stress that they have some ideas of their own on settling international problems which do not coincide with US and French viewpoints."

Khrushchev's conciliatory letters of 15 May to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan highlighted Soviet efforts to manipulate the nuclear test cessation issue as a device for exploiting Anglo-American differences and for creating an impression of progress toward agreement which could be used to justify a summit meeting. Khrushchev welcomed the President's readiness to study Macmillan's proposal, endorsed earlier by Khrushchev, for a predetermined number of annual on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions. He asserted that agreement on this proposal "would pave the way for the conclusion of an agreement to end all kinds of tests" and portrayed the President as agreeing to the Soviet thesis that "such inspections should not be numerous."

The Soviet premier's warm note to Macmillan referring to the "closeness of our positions on your idea" was calculated to place London under increasing domestic pressure to conclude an agreement.

While Khrushchev's letter to the President accepted in part the Western proposal for further technical discussions on condition they are limited to a study of high-altitude detection, the USSR continues to insist that the fixing of the number of annual inspections is essentially a matter for high-level political decision.

Khrushchev contended in his letter that there is little need for a "special study of criteria for settling so simple and clear a question" as the number of inspections. He warned that debates on criteria might be endless and implied that the United States might prolong them as a means of forestalling an agreement.

Khrushchev has reaffirmed the Soviet position that unanimity of the three nuclear powers would not be required to dispatch inspection teams if the number of inspections is agreed upon in advance.

The Soviet leaders probably hope that the British Government will be inclined to favor their thesis that an inspection quota should be established on a high political level and that any differences between London and Washington on this issue can be exploited to advance Soviet objectives on other questions under negotiation at the foreign ministers' conference and a possible summit meeting.

Western Reactions

The plan of Reuters news agency to open an office in East Berlin gave rise to renewed French and German charges of British "softness." In a tripartite meeting in Bonn, the French minister called the move most unfortunate at this time in view of its undesirable political aspects. The British Government appears not to have been consulted on the move, nor to have advised Reuters of any possible repercussions. The Federation of British Industries has denied a report that it, too, planned to open an office in East Berlin.

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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The Western European press has adopted a generally pessimistic tone on the prospects for serious negotiations on the German question. The British press for the most part is agreed that the West's package proposal contains several items which might tempt Moscow, but that the items will have to be discussed separately. The Communist-inspired press in France has been emphasizing the possibility of agreement on nuclear test cessation.

Leading papers in France and Britain have admitted that the question of Berlin may have to be considered separately from the German question or face the risk of breaking off the talks. Several German papers pointed to Berlin as the central question. One prominent progovernment paper in West Germany stated that neither side had made an effort toward serious negotiations. (SECRET NOFORN) (Concurred in by OSI)

MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim has reiterated his opposition to a renewal of activity by political parties in the face of local Communist pressure, and he apparently is still refusing to admit Communists to the cabinet as party representatives. Foreign Minister Jawad, a non-Communist, said again this week that the general political situation in Iraq is "improving." Jawad, who claims to know Qasim's thinking, believes the prime minister will gradually take steps to check pressures which tend to "alter Iraq's neutrality."

The National Democratic party (NDP), of which Jawad is a member, has announced suspension of its own activities in what appears to be an effort to support Qasim's stand. This move, the NDP leaders argue, demonstrates their party's obedience to Qasim's wishes and leaves the Communists isolated. It may have the effect of also leaving the field of mass political

activity even more open to the Communists.

Since 16 May Cairo's press attacks on the Iraqi Communists have been sharpened with charges that the party intends to "go underground" to prepare an uprising.


Economically, Iraq is still suffering from administrative chaos, growing labor unrest, and a general exodus of Western businessmen and technicians; there is a distinct possibility that a new round of wage demands, spurred by Communist elements in the labor unions, will produce inflationary pressures which would in turn provide further opportunities for Communist agitation. Lack of coordination between Iraqi Government departments has resulted in such situations as the boycott--for doing business with Israel--of a petroleum firm which supplies the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force's jet fuel. The "purge committees" which have demoralized government offices are being extended to private enterprise.

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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Date 7/9/93

REF 93-3

11 June 1959

SUBJECT: SNIE 100-7-59: SOVIET TACTICS ON BERLIN

#### THE PROBLEM

To estimate likely Soviet tactics on the Berlin issue, assuming that the Geneva Conference terminates without result and without agreement to a summit meeting.

#### QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PROBLEM

1. If the Soviets allow the Geneva meeting to end in stalemate, they will presumably do so on the calculation that a period of additional pressure on the Berlin problem will finally induce the Western Powers to make substantial concessions. The Soviets might anticipate creating a situation in which the Western Powers under pressure of a deepening crisis would be forced to come to the summit, and would be prepared there to accept a settlement more favorable to the USSR than any they have so far contemplated. The main questions posed by this assumed Soviet course are: What degree of pressure would the Soviets think appropriate to achieve the result

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sought? What would be the measures they might undertake to apply this pressure?

COURSE I -- THE ALTERNATIVE OF EXTREME PRESSURE AT AN EARLY DATE

2. As an extreme degree of pressure the Soviets might proceed forthwith to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR and simultaneously turn over Berlin access controls to the GDR. The latter could then begin, possibly after a brief interval, to apply restrictions or conditions to access intended to test the determination of the Western Powers and to raise tensions still further. The USSR could repeat its warnings that any resort to force by the Western Powers would cause the USSR to invoke its obligations under the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets would recognize that this degree of pressure would probably provoke a major crisis, and they would not so act unless they estimated that the West would not resort to force and would finally accept in substance the Soviet demands for a revision of the status of Berlin.

3. There are a number of reasons why the course of extreme pressure described in the preceding paragraph is probably not the one which the Soviets would adopt at this time. We believe that, as the Berlin crisis developed, the Soviets may have become less certain that they could count

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on the West not to react with force. They apparently concluded at some point after they initiated the crisis last November that, unless they were willing to run grave risks of war, they would have to achieve their aims by negotiation. Moreover, to provoke such risks now would further compromise the "peaceloving" image which Soviet policy is trying to present, especially in Asia and Africa. Even if the Soviets believed that the Western Powers could be forced out of Berlin without hostilities, they would recognize that many of the post-crisis effects would be highly undesirable from the Soviet point of view. The Western Powers would probably be stimulated to close ranks and to increase their military effort. This latter would probably take the form of accelerated growth of the missile-nuclear threat to the Bloc in Western Europe, which the USSR has been trying hard to check. The outlook would be for an intensified period of cold war tensions. The net effects of all this on the Bloc's current domestic and foreign policies would probably be seen by them as adverse. These considerations persuade us that a course of extreme pressure in the wake of a Geneva stalemate is not one the Soviets would be likely to pursue. Even if they did pursue it, however, we believe that they would not do so beyond a point which they estimated would be likely to lead to war.

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COURSE II -- THE ALTERNATIVE OF GRADUATED, PROTRACTED  
PRESSURE TO OBTAIN RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS

4. The more likely alternative for the Soviets to adopt would be to increase pressures on the Berlin issue gradually and only in such degree as in their opinion would tend to induce the Western Powers to resume negotiations later, preferably at the summit, this time on terms more favorable to the Soviet positions. There would have to be a nice degree of calculation in this course. The measures taken to implement it would have to be of a kind which the West would not see as mere verbal threats. On the other hand, they should not be of a kind to present the West with a fait accompli in Berlin which would provoke a showdown prematurely. These measures would be intended to convince the West that the Soviets were prepared to take unilateral action, but that some time and room remained for negotiations to avoid a showdown, and perhaps to salvage something of Western interests. Inducements would be provided in the form of Soviet statements of readiness to resume negotiations at any time. We think steps of this kind would be open to the Soviets to take, and that their course of action after Geneva would probably be of this character.

5. Such a Soviet campaign to build up pressure gradually accompanied by demands to resume negotiations, would probably

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begin with propaganda blaming the Western Powers' rigidity for the breakdown at Geneva. There would be warnings that the danger of a clash over Berlin was increasing, and announcements that the USSR was still determined to achieve its demands in Berlin. Such propaganda could be orchestrated with harsher notes issuing from East Germany. A plausible next step would relate to the negotiation of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, with intervals of time between the successive phases -- setting of a date for negotiations, then a negotiating conference and initialling, and finally ratification. Once this latter stage had been reached, full implementation would not need to be undertaken at once. The Soviets might first withdraw their forces from East Berlin as an earnest of their intentions, and only later and by degrees turn over access controls to the GDR. Even when this process was complete the GDR might still not attempt to interfere with Western access, and might even announce that it would not do so for a certain period. At this stage the Soviets would probably estimate that the Western Powers would still believe that they had room for negotiation since they have already agreed to accept GDR access control under some formulation of the agent theory. The aim at all stages would be to convince the Western Powers, or at least one or

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more of them, that the possibility of negotiation remained open but was constantly narrowing.

6. The Soviets would probably recognize that such gradually mounting pressure might fail in its purpose of inducing the Western Powers to resume negotiations on terms more favorable to the Soviets. But the Soviets would nevertheless see several advantages in it. They would believe:

(a) That the steps taken would have advanced the Soviets toward a unilateral achievement of their aims in Berlin or would have prepared the basis for direct harassment or closure of access to Berlin along the lines discussed in Paragraph 2.

(b) That, even if they wished to resort to such extreme pressure finally, the protracted tension over the Berlin issue would have sowed sufficient alarm and disarray in the West so that it would be unable to confront an eventual showdown with unity and firmness.

(c) Finally, that even if the course of graduated pressure did fail the Soviets would not be obliged to pass over to the more extreme course described in Paragraph 2. They could always decide to settle for a "compromise" which

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would leave the GDR and the USSR in a better position than they had before raising the Berlin issue last November.

7. The carrying out of each Soviet move outlined in COURSE II would be influenced by the firmness and unity with which the West met each successive step.

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REF ID: A66844

CLASSIFICATION

CIA MEMORANDUM

13 July 1959

U.S. Negotiating Position on Berlin - 1959-62

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum states a US view of the probable alteration of the balance of military power between the present and 1961/62. The West's ability to maintain its position in Berlin after a moratorium would depend on many nonmilitary factors and also upon interim developments which cannot now be foreseen. Among these will be the view the Soviets will then take of their over-all power position vis-a-vis the West, since this will determine the degree of pressure they will think it feasible to apply. They may, for example, take a different view of the military trends discussed above. Likewise, the view taken generally in the West of the relative power position will bear heavily on the outcome of a new trial of strength over the city.

2. In our view, the probable course of developments between now and 1961/62 will lead both the Soviets and the West to conclude that the relative power position of the USSR has substantially improved, and that the position of the West in Berlin is more untenable than it is now. The most important and the most predictable of these is the Soviets' relative gain in nuclear delivery capabilities referred to above. Their increased ability to inflict catastrophic damage on the West, and particularly on the US, is likely to convince them that they can apply still greater pressure on positions like Berlin without assuming increased risks. Awareness of these Soviet gains may reduce the inclination in the West to take a firm and united stand for an exposed position like Berlin. In Western Europe in particular, realization that the US has become more vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack may sap the conviction that the USSR would in a showdown really be deterred by US retaliatory capability. Any decline of confidence in US power would also have some erosive effect on the firmness of the resistance spirit in West Berlin.

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3. Other developments over the next few years are likely to reinforce an impression in both the Bloc and the West that the Bloc is growing stronger relative to the West. The outlook is for a period of political stability within the Bloc under the firm leadership of Khrushchev. Bloc economic growth is likely to continue at a rate more rapid than that of the West. New Soviet scientific achievements are likely to further enhance Soviet world prestige. At the same time, NATO seems likely to be in for a rough passage, in part over issues unrelated to the confrontation with the USSR, and this will probably add to an impression of declining strength in the West relative to the USSR.

4. A number of developments are possible by 1961/62 which may counterbalance the impression that the USSR is in a stronger position to contest an issue like Berlin. It is possible, for example, that Khrushchev will no longer be on hand to give Soviet policy its present quality of exuberant and confident brinkmanship. After his departure from the scene other Soviet leaders, especially in the early succession phase, might play a more cautious game. There may be political or economic difficulties and setbacks within some Bloc states, or in relations between members of the Bloc, which would diminish the impression of growing Soviet power. Depending on wholly unpredictable political developments in the principal Western states, the West may react to the sense of a growing Soviet threat by increasing its unity and determination.

5. Taken together, all the above considerations point in the direction of making the Berlin position more difficult to defend at a later date. Nevertheless, the tendency is not in our view so highly probable or so weighty that we must take this as a foregone conclusion. The importance of factors which cannot now be foreseen is likely to be as great as those which can now be tentatively estimated. It is also possible that the Soviets will estimate that their over-all world position in 1961/62 offers such favorable prospects of important gains without serious risks that they will not wish to provoke a sharp new crisis over Berlin which would jeopardize such gains. Moreover, the West has open to it actions and policies which could have the effect of improving the outlook.

3.

6. Even if the relative Soviet power position improves in fact and in the world's view of it, we believe that the USSR will still be under considerable constraint, in 1961/62, in seeking to enforce its will on a key issue like Berlin. The Soviets' relative gain in nuclear capabilities will not enable them to conclude that they can surely defeat the West in a general nuclear war at a cost that they would regard as acceptable, except in the highly unlikely event that they were able to achieve complete strategic surprise. They will still be deterred from bringing maximum pressure to bear because they will still wish to avoid nuclear war and they will still be uncertain that the West would allow itself to be expelled from Berlin without going to war. The fact that there will continue to be a considerable degree of deterrence imposed on Soviet actions will mean that, in 1961/62 as at present, they will be led to seek their aims by negotiation. Their negotiating position will probably be stronger but it will not be so decisively strong as to compel the West to accept their demands.

7. All of these imponderables bearing on the situation following a moratorium period would be profoundly affected by the actual terms of the moratorium. Most damaging to the strength of the Western position in 1961/62 would be any implication in those terms that at the end of the moratorium a fundamental change in the status of the city was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, if the West agreed merely to resume negotiations later, without prejudice to its present rights and clearly with the intention to continue to uphold them and with them the freedom of the city, this fact would offset other factors acting to weaken the Western position. The terms of the moratorium would probably be the singly most important factor affecting the attitude of the population and political leadership of West Berlin in particular. Likewise any so-called peripheral concessions attending the moratorium, in particular any reduction of Western troop strength in Berlin, could seriously weaken the will of the city to maintain resistance. Without this, as the Soviets clearly recognize by their attempts to obtain drastic peripheral concessions, the position in West Berlin would in fact become indefensible.

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OCI NO. 401 1/2

27 August 1974

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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
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27 August 1959

PART II (continued)



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
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EAST GERMAN PRESSURE FOR ACCESS CONTROLS APPEARS  
SUSPENDED . . . . .

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The USSR has apparently decided not to press at this time for increased East German authority on the access routes to Berlin. This decision, probably related to the forthcoming Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks, is suggested by two almost apologetic Soviet replies to recent US protests over East German harassing tactics. The East Germans will probably be restrained from interfering with Allied traffic at least until after the Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits.

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
THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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EAST GERMAN PRESSURE FOR ACCESS CONTROLS APPEARS SUSPENDED

The USSR, in a move probably related to the upcoming Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks, has apparently reversed a June decision which appeared to forecast increased East German harassing tactics against Allied

traffic to Berlin and has decided not to press at this time for more East German authority on the access routes.

General Zakharov, the Soviet commandant in Berlin,

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

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
## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

27 August 1959

replying, on 22 August to his American counterpart's protest over East German interference with official American travelers on the autobahn, said these harassments "seemed unnecessary" and that he would look into the matter. Having just returned from a two-month absence, Zakharov seemed surprised to learn of the matter. The acting Soviet commandant on 30 July had replied in a similar conciliatory vein to an American protest over East German interference with a US military train.

These two almost apologetic replies follow sporadic efforts during the Berlin crisis to assert East German authority on the autobahn. On 22 June the acting Soviet commandant had stated in a letter to the US commandant that, while the USSR accepted the responsibility to control Allied traffic at the checkpoints, the autobahn itself was beyond the Soviet "sphere of influence." The effort to impose East German control has mainly been on the autobahn, with only a few minor attempts to include East Germans in the checking procedure on the railroads. Moscow evidently considered the heavily traveled autobahn route most susceptible to East German encroachment.

This apparent Soviet decision not to press for East German authority on the access



routes probably does not please the East Berlin leaders, who are sensitive on the sovereignty issue and would like to push ahead to improve their regime's status wherever possible. Concern over this issue may be one reason party boss Ulbricht is presently conferring with Khrushchev on the Black Sea coast.

According to Albert Norden, East German party politburo member, Ulbricht intends "to stay as close as possible" to Khrushchev in order to make sure the Soviet leader does not waver in his resolve to abide by previously agreed positions on the German and Berlin questions. Ulbricht may fear that Khrushchev, in his coming talks with President Eisenhower, may make

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
some concession at the expense of East German aspirations for sovereignty.

While an agreement that would bar East Germany permanently from trying to assert its sovereignty over the ac-

cess routes is unlikely to result from the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange, the East Germans will probably be restrained from interfering with Allied traffic at least until after the visits. [REDACTED]

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## THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AND TACTICS ON THE BERLIN PROBLEM

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the current Soviet attitude on the Berlin problem and the manner in which Soviet tactics may develop over the next several months.

### THE ESTIMATE

#### The Current Soviet Approach To the Berlin Issue

1. The issue of West Berlin probably seems to the Soviets to be a key one in the May Summit meeting. Although they have subordinated it, at least in a formal sense, to the other agenda items of disarmament and a peace treaty for Germany, they probably do not expect any very far-reaching results at this first Summit on these latter problems. They probably think that there is a fair chance that the Western Powers will take some step toward accommodation on the Berlin issue if the Soviet case is pressed hard and skillfully.

2. Their hope for a success of some sort on Berlin in the Summit negotiations evidently rests on a genuine confidence in the strength of the Soviet position. Khrushchev undoubtedly hopes that the Western Powers will be disposed to make concessions because they recognize that the USSR is capable of and intends unilateral actions which, if reacted against with force, would involve them in greater risks than they are willing to take. Apparently contributing also to Soviet confidence is a continuing belief, which was manifest during the Geneva Foreign Ministers meetings, that the Western Powers may not

be able to maintain a united front against Soviet demands.

3. Reflecting this appraisal of the situation, as well as an attempt to build up a strong bargaining position in advance of the Summit, there has been a noticeable hardening of Soviet public statements on the Berlin question in recent months. The threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany has become more insistent and innuendoes about the consequences of this act for the Western position in Berlin more ominous. In thus attempting to build up pressure Khrushchev has come as close as possible to repudiating his pledges against issuing an ultimatum without actually doing so. The Soviets are probably aware that a too obvious and excessive use of pressure could have the effect of compromising the move for detente which they claim to want, or possibly even prejudice Western attendance at the Summit Conference. But their dilemma is that they realize that, without pressure at least in the background, the Western Powers have no incentive to consider the Soviet demands on Berlin seriously at all.

4. There is a sense, we believe, in which the Soviets do genuinely want a detente. In many respects, Khrushchev's internal policies and his plans for competing against Western influence in uncommitted areas would be

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avored by some degree of cold war truce. Nevertheless, the Soviets' understanding of what constitutes detente continues to be defined in terms of Western concessions or, as they put it, "abandonment by the West of cold war positions." This is not all hypocrisy; Khrushchev probably really believes that the West should see the Soviet gains in power as a reason for finally accepting the status quo in Eastern Europe, adjusting the "abnormal" situation in Berlin, and giving at least de facto recognition to East Germany. While Khrushchev spoke on 31 October of "mutual concessions," this note has not been sustained, and there is currently no sign that the Soviets intend to approach the Berlin problem in a spirit of what the West would consider mutual accommodation.

5. We do not believe that the Soviets' desire for a relaxation of tensions is urgent enough to exclude tactics of very severe pressure on the West in pursuit of their objectives in Berlin. While the language of relaxation and peaceful coexistence is the same as that which has been employed by Soviet policy on other occasions during a negotiating phase, it now clothes a fundamentally different motivation. Negotiation is not now conceived, as so often earlier, as a tactical maneuver to cope with an enemy of superior power, but rather as a procedure to obtain peaceful delivery of the concessions which the Soviets consider their growing power entitles them to expect. This reasoning applies particularly to the case of West Berlin which the Soviets now see as an over-extended Western position. In this mood, they will not be willing to accept for long a total rebuff to their demands without an attempt to increase the pressures very substantially.

#### Tactics at the Summit

6. When the Paris meeting opens the initial Soviet position is likely to be a maximum one—participation of the two German states, a peace treaty or treaties with them on the basis of the Soviet draft, and the Free City arrangement for West Berlin. We do not believe that Khrushchev will allow the issue of German participation to endanger the conference, and even the Soviet peace treaty draft is likely to

be pushed only pro forma. As for Berlin itself, the Soviets already are on record as being willing to approach their objectives by stages, or through an interim agreement limited in time. Therefore, in negotiations concerning Berlin, the hard bargaining areas for the Soviets will be: (a) whether in principle the "abnormal" situation in Berlin should be altered (this will exclude explicit acceptance of the West's principle that its rights continue until Germany is unified); and (b) what first steps should be taken toward altering the "occupation regime" in West Berlin in the direction of a new status. Since the Summit conference will be of too brief duration to permit any intricate or prolonged maneuvers in developing a negotiating position, we expect that these essentials of the Soviet position will appear fairly promptly.

7. This approach probably excludes any Soviet design for a major tension-producing showdown in the Summit itself. It means that the Soviets will not insist upon achieving their full Free City plan at once. We believe that they would be satisfied to obtain undertakings which would mark Western consent to begin changing the situation in West Berlin. The Soviets may even be willing to accept a certain ambiguity about the meaning of the steps taken. They recognize that the ability of the West to maintain its position in Berlin depends, to a critical degree, on a belief on the part of the West Berlin population in the will and power of the West to preserve the freedom of the city. If the steps taken were viewed in Berlin as likely to lead ultimately to Western withdrawal, a major loss of confidence in the intentions of the Western Powers would result, and could undermine the situation politically and cause severe economic disruption. Unfavorable reactions in West Germany also would probably further contribute to the political and economic weakening of the situation in Berlin. In such an atmosphere, the Soviets would expect to move still more rapidly toward the outcome they seek.

8. Consequently, the steps for which they are most likely to press in order to give the impression of Western retreat will probably include: a reduction in Western troop strengths;

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removal of West German political and administrative activities from the city; a formal repudiation by the Western Powers of any constitutional link between West Berlin and the Federal Republic; Soviet (and if possible East German) participation in a supervisory commission to control "subversive activities" and otherwise to "reduce tensions" in West Berlin during an interim phase of limited duration. We are unable to judge whether such steps, or which of them, would constitute the minimum Soviet position. It is possible that the real minimum would be simply an agreement to resume negotiations on Berlin with terms of reference which the Soviets could interpret as a step toward an eventual outcome favorable to them.

9. It is possible, but we think unlikely, that the Soviets would be willing to postpone their demands on the Berlin issue if they thought there were good prospects for progress on other issues. The disarmament field, taken as a whole, is too large and complex and the positions are too far apart to permit of anything the Soviets would be likely to call progress. It is possible that Western concessions on nuclear tests, or on partial disarmament steps in Germany, including restraints on West Germany, could have the effect of removing the Berlin demands from the center of the stage for the time being. However, any postponement of the Berlin issue achieved in this fashion would probably be of brief duration. The development most likely to lead Khrushchev to hold the Berlin issue in abeyance would be agreement for negotiations by a four-power commission or an all-German committee within a set time limit on the terms of a peace treaty with the "two Germanies."

#### Soviet Actions Post-Summit

10. If the Summit should result in a complete standoff on Berlin, and the Soviets are convinced that no movement in the Western position will be forthcoming, they would have two broad choices. They could agree to a formula for extending negotiation at some level without any Western commitment in principle to agree to a change in the Berlin situation. Probably they would think that to do this would be tantamount to calling off for

the present at least the campaign on the Berlin issue which began in November 1958. They would probably not expect to be able to maintain sufficient psychological momentum or pressure if negotiations could thus appear to be extended indefinitely. Alternatively, they could proceed to make the separate treaty with East Germany. Their commitment to do this has been so explicit and so often repeated that we think it likely they have already resolved, barring a development at the Summit favorable to the Soviet demands, to take the step. They probably have not yet decided upon the timing or upon what "consequences" they should apply to the Western position in and access to Berlin.

11. A separate treaty would probably not be signed immediately after the Summit and a decent interval might also be allowed after the President's visit to the USSR, although an announcement that they were beginning consultations with interested parties for such a treaty might come at any time, even immediately after the Summit. In any case, if no prospect of a break in the stalemate appeared within a few months, it is likely that a separate treaty would actually be signed.

12. In taking this step, the Soviets would probably not intend immediately to put a squeeze on access to Berlin. They might use some technicality to delay transferring access controls for several months. And when the transfer took place, they would probably expect the Western Powers to continue to use the access routes under the "agent" theory, although the Soviets would not themselves concede that the East Germans were present at entry points as their agents. In this new phase their principal lever would be the threat of an unacceptable administration of access controls by the East Germans. We believe that even in this phase the Soviets would still seek to achieve their aim of altering the status of Berlin basically through Western agreement in negotiations. However, at some point, depending on their judgment of Western intentions, they might attempt to deny access or to impose conditions which in the Western view were equivalent to denial of access.

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

KHRUSHCHEV'S STRATEGY ON BERLIN

Since the breakdown of the summit conference, Communist tactics on the Berlin issue have been gradually brought into line with the more aggressive posture toward the West adopted by Khrushchev. Following an initial period of reassuring gestures by Moscow, the bloc has mounted an extensive psychological warfare operation apparently designed to focus public attention on the dangerous aspects of the Berlin situation and to dispel any notion in the West that Moscow has retreated from its basic demands on the Berlin and German treaty questions.

The dominant element in this campaign remains the threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany, followed by East German assumption of access controls to Berlin. Public warnings to this effect by Khrushchev, although still imprecise as to manner and timing, have been buttressed by threats voiced in private to Western officials and by an intensified effort to create a state of anxiety and uncertainty in West Berlin, weaken its ties with Bonn, and generate dissension among the Western allies.

Early Post-Summit Tactics

The violence of Khrushchev's performance in Paris, his off-hand comments to the press there about a separate peace treaty with East Germany, and the announcement of a stopover in Berlin caused widespread speculation that he would follow through on his frequent pre-summit threats to take unilateral action and force a showdown on Berlin.

In the atmosphere of heightened tensions, Khrushchev also probably felt compelled to spell out his position as soon as possible.

To the visible displeasure and astonishment of most of his audience at East Berlin, Khrushchev in his speech there on 20 May counseled patience and forbearance on a separate treaty. Asserting the bloc's "moral right" to proceed without delay, he nevertheless held out hope



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
for a new summit meeting and stated, "In these conditions it makes sense to wait a little and to try, by joint efforts of all the victorious powers, to find a solution to the questions." More categorically, Khrushchev declared that the existing situation would have to be maintained until a new meeting, "which, it should be assumed, will take place in six to eight months."

As a condition to this pledge, however, the Soviet leader added that the Western powers would have to adhere to the same principles and take no unilateral steps which would prevent a meeting of the heads

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of government. He also warned that neither the USSR nor East Germany would wait forever on a peace treaty.

The East German leaders, who apparently had concluded that the Paris debate signaled a sharp and immediate shift of position on Berlin and Germany, privately pressed Khrushchev for prompt action.



In the foreign policy review which undoubtedly took place in the Kremlin, the Soviet leaders probably realized that agreement to maintain the status quo for six to eight months could deprive Soviet policy of a means of pressure to ensure continuing Western interest in negotiating a Berlin settlement. They may also have been concerned over increasing Western speculation that Khrushchev's torpedoing of the summit was designed to cover a retreat on Berlin.

To counter any such impression, Khrushchev used a press conference on 3 June to warn that the Western powers should not delude themselves into believing that if they delayed a summit meeting, a solution

of the Berlin and German questions would be "indefinitely postponed." He stated that at the end of the six- to eight-month period, "we shall meet, discuss, and sign a treaty" giving the East Germans full control over access to Berlin. In effect, Khrushchev attempted to put a new US administration on notice that it must be amenable to negotiations on Berlin or face a new and dangerous crisis.

#### The New Phase

As the more militant campaign against the United States gained momentum, Communist tactics on the Berlin question were considerably sharpened. The East Germans have used a wide variety of means to create a state of anxiety and uncertainty. The principal targets for harassment have been the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany, whose personnel have been physically assaulted, closely watched,

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restricted in their travel, and subjected to insulting and irritating incidents. The East Germans have also pointed up the vulnerability of West German access to Berlin by detaining West German trucks and warning against "misuse" of the roads and air corridors.

The new moves have been undertaken against a background of East German claims to sovereignty over West Berlin and repeated assertions that the Allies have forfeited all rights through violation of the Potsdam agreements.

The bloc has also initiated a series of moves on the diplomatic level. Both the Soviet and East German regimes have dispatched notes protesting against alleged recruitment in Berlin of personnel for the West German armed forces and against West German plans to establish a radio station in West Berlin. Warsaw has challenged the NATO powers to explain any commitments given Adenauer on recovering territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line, and the Czechs have generally echoed East German statements and protests.

The East German leaders have reportedly made plans for a wide variety of actions ranging from mass disturbances to an outright coup if the Kremlin decides to force a showdown.

Vague hints

of future action are probably designed to recoup the prestige which the East German leaders have lost and to distract attention from serious internal problems. They may also be trying to bolster the sagging morale of the rank-and-file Communists who had expected more action from Khrushchev after the summit.


#### Bundestag Meeting in Berlin

The most serious threat of action in the immediate future came from Khrushchev during his visit to Austria. In reply to a planted question in his final press conference on 8 July, Khrushchev warned that if Bonn held its annual session of the Bundestag in Berlin this fall, "perhaps at the same time a peace treaty will be signed with East Germany, and thus all Bundestag deputies will have to obtain visas from (East German Premier) Grotewohl to be able to leave Berlin for Bonn."

Khrushchev probably seized on this issue to test the unity and firmness of Western reaction. Realizing the differences which developed among the Allies, Bonn, and Berlin when a similar situation arose in 1959 over holding the West German presidential elections in Berlin, Khrushchev probably anticipated that the issue would again prove divisive and provide Moscow with some indication of Allied policy in the event of a showdown on a separate treaty. As in the past,

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however, Khrushchev has been careful to avoid committing himself irrevocably in the event the meeting is held. This issue could be used as a pretext for unilateral action, however, should Moscow decide to seek a showdown rather than await new negotiations.



Should Khrushchev decide that his political and diplomatic campaign is failing to generate sufficient pressure on the West, he could instruct the East Germans to provoke further incidents and serious disturbances to underline his claim that the West Berlin situation could "give rise to dangerous accidents." The East German regime can call on some 6,000 Communists already living in the Western sectors and can rapidly infiltrate, if need be, 12,000 to 16,000 members of the specially trained workers' militia (Kampfgruppen). Last October 1,000 to 5,000 Kampfgruppen members were brought over during the riots over the display of the new East German flag on the Berlin elevated railway, which is controlled by the East Germans.

#### Cutlook

In the current phase of Moscow's policy, Berlin remains the test case of whether the Soviet leaders intend to pass from bullying behavior to actions involving grave risks. Khrushchev's handling of the issue thus far suggests that he continues to realize the danger of resorting to unilateral action to advance his objectives, and that he is in no hurry to implement his threats. Since the opening of the Berlin crisis in November 1958, the Kremlin has consistently employed the threat of a transfer of Berlin access controls as a pressure tactic to force negotiations and extract concessions. Since the lapse of the initial six-month ultimatum, Khrushchev has been careful to avoid committing the USSR to a specific time for a separate treaty.

Khrushchev's long and close personal identification with the issue, however, is a compelling reason for him to crown his two-year campaign on Berlin with some significant advance which would justify his past policies and demonstrate their continuing validity. The achievement of some gain by means of negotiation, preferably at the summit, probably has taken on a new significance for him in the face of continuing Chinese Communist criticism of both his methods and his strategy in dealing with the West.

Post-summit statements by Khrushchev and other Communist leaders suggest that the Kremlin may feel that insufficient effort was devoted to propaganda and agitation to build up pressure prior to the Paris meeting. That the Kremlin does not intend to make a similar error was recently evident in Pravda's republication of Italian Communist leader Togliatti's remarks:

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"While it appeared before that the leaders of all the Western powers, with the exception of Adenauer's Germany, realized the need for a summit conference, it now suddenly became impossible. Consequently a new struggle is required for creating conditions for convening a summit conference and its effective work. New public pressure upon the governments of main capitalist countries is essential...."

With negotiations temporarily in abeyance, Communist tactics will probably continue to reflect Togliatti's call for struggle and pressure.

Despite Khrushchev's apparent intention to hold open the possibility for new negotiations,

a long and bitter anti-Western campaign will have the effect of erecting barriers against an attempt to work back toward the conference table. Khrushchev may well overestimate the ease and speed with which he can shift gears. While Moscow probably continues to prefer a further round of negotiations as a necessary prelude to a separate treaty, the day of decision cannot be postponed indefinitely without a substantial loss of prestige for Khrushchev in the eyes of his bloc and Chinese colleagues.

In anticipation of renewed diplomatic pressure to force negotiations in the spring of 1961, the campaign of harassments, probing actions, and political warfare can be expected to intensify.

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